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WE ARE ALL ENTREPRENEURS NOW
David E. Pozen*

A funny thing happened to the entrepreneur in legal, business,
and social science scholarship. She strayed from her capitalist
roots, took on more and more functions that have little to do
with starting or running a business, and became wildly
popular in the process. Nowadays, “social entrepreneurs”
tackle civic problems through innovative methods, “policy
entrepreneurs” promote new forms of government action, “norm
entrepreneurs” seek to change the way society thinks or behaves,
and “moral entrepreneurs” try to alter the boundaries of duty or
compassion.
“Ethnification entrepreneurs,” “polarization
entrepreneurs,” and other newfangled spinoffs pursue more
discrete objectives. Entrepreneurial rhetoric has never been so
trendy or so plastic. This Article documents the proliferation of
entrepreneurs in the American academic idiom, and it offers
some reflections on the causes and consequences of this trend.

INTRODUCTION
Everyone, it seems, is an entrepreneur these days. People who
tackle civic problems through innovative methods are “social
entrepreneurs.” Those who promote new forms of legislation or
government action are “policy entrepreneurs.” Those who seek to
change the way society thinks or feels about an issue are “norm
entrepreneurs.” Those who try to alter the boundaries of altruism or
deviance are “moral entrepreneurs.” Martin Luther King, Jr., it
turns out, was a social, policy, norm, and moral entrepreneur all at
1
the same time.
And then, of course, there are the capitalist

* For the 2007–2008 academic year, the author is serving as Special
Assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy under the Yale Law School Heyman
Fellowship Program. He thanks William Baumol, Mark Casson, George Priest,
and John Paul Rollert.
1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY 44 (1999) (identifying Martin Luther King, Jr. as an exemplary “moral
entrepreneur”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 48 (1997)
(identifying Dr. King as an exemplary “norm entrepreneur”); Susan R. Jones,
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Legacy: An Economic Justice Imperative, 19
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entrepreneurs, starting for-profit ventures and transforming
economic markets as usual. Capitalist entrepreneurship no longer
ends at the founding, though: once those ventures become settled
concerns, employees may become “intrapreneurs” by pioneering an
initiative or subsidiary within the existing corporate structure.
This Article documents the proliferation of entrepreneurs in the
American academic idiom over the past few decades, and it offers
some reflections on the significance of this trend. While the terms
are distinct—each with its own etymology, its own set of meanings
and applications, and its own interpretive community—the Article
suggests that considering them as a group can be illuminating. For
it turns out that the “new entrepreneurs,” as I will call them, share
many features both in theory and in development.
Part I is descriptive: it traces the intellectual history of these
concepts and offers a critical synthesis of the literature on each.
Part II is diagnostic: it explores possible reasons why the concepts
and their associated terms have taken hold. Part III is evaluative: it
unpacks the terms’ implicit market metaphor, identifying its defects
but ultimately defending entrepreneurship’s linguistic migration.
The basic contribution of this Article is to provide the first
integrated account of the new entrepreneurs. With Parts II and III,
I hope also to provide some insight into this phenomenon and to give
a sense of what is at stake.
I.

ENTREPRENEURS THEN AND NOW

To be able to evaluate the rise of the new entrepreneurs, it is
useful to contextualize these terms in light of their lexical
progenitor. This Part sketches the history of entrepreneurship first
as an economic concept and then as an extra-economic concept. An
enormous body of commentary addresses each of these forms of
entrepreneurship, and I cannot begin to do justice to it in this space.
This overview is meant only to familiarize readers with the basic
background and to provide a descriptive foundation for the
diagnoses and critiques that follow.
Although capitalist entrepreneurship has often been ignored in
the work of classical and neoclassical economists, as Section A
explains, it has played a central role in Austrian, Schumpeterian,
and institutionalist schools of economic theory. Section B shows

WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 60 (2005) (identifying Dr. King as an exemplary
“social entrepreneur”); Simon Maxwell, Policy Entrepreneurship, in OVERSEAS
DEV. INST., RESEARCH AND POLICY IN DEVELOPMENT: DOES EVIDENCE MATTER?
MEETING SERIES 55, 55 (2004), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/Rapid
/Publications/Documents/Monograph_all_web.pdf (identifying Dr. King, as an
exemplary “policy entrepreneur”).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1044021
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how
the
concepts
of
social
entrepreneurship,
policy
entrepreneurship,
norm
entrepreneurship,
and
moral
entrepreneurship have all gained currency with impressive speed
over the past thirty-odd years. This has not been a collective
phenomenon: exponents of these concepts have developed them with
hardly any reference to the economic literature or to each other.
And yet, the etiologies of the new entrepreneurial buzzwords share
certain structural similarities.
A.

Capitalist Entrepreneurs in Economic Theory

Theories of entrepreneurship have a long and rich history in
Western economic thought. Numerous influential economists have
proffered definitions of entrepreneurship as an aspect of their
broader positive or normative projects, in which they identify core
traits of the entrepreneur and explain his or her role in a market
2
economy. There is a “disjointed nature” to this body of work, some
have pointed out, because entrepreneurship has been from the start
an extremely capacious concept, and commentators have invoked it
for a variety of ends. Theories of entrepreneurship abound, but we
have no completely satisfying synthetic account of the practice, and
we probably never will.
Modern dictionary definitions of entrepreneurship tend to
emphasize three interrelated functions. First, the entrepreneur
initiates and organizes a business venture, identifying an
opportunity and assembling the necessary tools, skills, and
personnel to pursue it. Second, the entrepreneur manages the
venture, overseeing its efforts to attract customers and generate
revenues, at least for an initial period. And third, the entrepreneur
assumes the risk of the venture, generally by investing his or her
3
own capital and reputation and by forsaking a guaranteed income.
Implicit in this last function is a tradeoff between the promise of
economic gain and the potential for economic loss—a tradeoff that is
dramatically exemplified in real life.
The majority of new
businesses in the United States will fail within their first several

2. MICHAEL MINTROM, POLICY ENTREPRENEURS AND SCHOOL CHOICE 71
(2000); see also Dan Johansson, Economics Without Entrepreneurship or
Institutions: A Vocabulary Analysis of Graduate Textbooks, 1 ECON. J. WATCH
515,
517
(2004),
available
at
http://www.econjournalwatch.org/pdf
/JohanssonPractice1December2004.pdf (“[T]here is no universally accepted
definition of the entrepreneur or of the entrepreneurial function.”).
3. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 597 (4th ed. 2000) (emphasizing these three functions); MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 417 (11th ed. 2003) (same); THE NEW
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 565 (2d ed. 2005) (same).
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years, but some succeed spectacularly, and many of America’s
wealthiest individuals made their fortunes as entrepreneurs.
Linked to the functional characteristics of the entrepreneur is a
set of personal traits that also plays an important role in defining
the term. Entrepreneurs, in the American imagination, are leaders,
innovators, pioneers, problem solvers, and risk takers; they are
diligent, persistent, charismatic, dynamic, imaginative, and
resourceful, the bricoleurs of the capitalist marketplace. The term’s
connotations are not wholly positive, however. Entrepreneurs can
be greedy, cunning, opportunistic, and self-interested, possessed of a
kind of Nietzschean will to power that may lead to domination and
5
destruction as well as to value creation.
The etymology of “entrepreneur” is tightly bound up with the
history of economic theorizing about capitalism. The term derives
from the French entreprendre, which translates roughly as to
6
undertake or to embark upon. It came into being in the early
fifteenth century and crossed the Channel around 1475 but did not
4. See ARNOLD C. COOPER ET AL., SURVIVAL AND FAILURE: A LONGITUDINAL
STUDY 2 (1989) (indicating that 67% of businesses fail within their first
four years); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SMALL BUSINESS EFFORTS TO
FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 19 (2000), available
at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00190.pdf (summarizing evidence that
approximately 80% of new businesses fail within five to seven years of
formation); THOMAS ZIMMERER & NORMAN M. SCARBOROUGH, ESSENTIALS OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 10 (3d ed. 2002)
(asserting that 24% of small businesses fail within two years and 63% fail
within six years); Amy E. Knaup, Survival and Longevity in the Business
Employment Dynamics Data, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2005, at 50, 51 (stating
that 34% of new businesses fail within their first two years and 56% fail within
four years).
5. Reflecting these two sides to the entrepreneurial profile, my thesaurus
tells me that entrepreneurs are explorers, heroes, knights, organizers, pioneers,
producers, romantics, undertakers, venturers, and voyagers; and yet
entrepreneurs are also synonymous with charlatans, gamblers, madcaps,
mercenaries, opportunists, pirates, rogues, speculators, swashbucklers, and
wheeler
dealers.
ROGET’S
NEW
MILLENNIUM
THESAURUS,
http://thesaurus.reference.com/browse/entrepreneur (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
The “dark side” of entrepreneurship can also be seen in critical commentary
that distinguishes between other-regarding public servants and narrowly selfinterested entrepreneurs. For a recent example from the legal literature, see
John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private
Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441 (2005). See also C. Mirjam van Praag,
Some Classic Views on Entrepreneurship, 147 DE ECONOMIST 311, 311–12 (1999)
(“Historically, philosophers of science did not hold entrepreneurs in high
esteem. . . . [T]he pecuniary return (gain) to entrepreneurship, was perceived as
robbery ever since Aristotle had introduced the persistent idea of economic
activity as a ‘Zero-sum game,’ i.e. one man’s gain is another man’s loss.”).
6. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 307 (2d ed. 1989).
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7

It was not until the mid-1750s, in an essay published
stick.
posthumously, that the Irish economist Richard Cantillon
8
introduced the term into mainstream economic discourse. Cantillon
divided economic actors into two broad camps, those who receive
assured incomes and those who do not. The latter, Cantillon
explained, are the entrepreneurs, and he gave as an example the
merchants who bought goods from country farmers at a fixed price
to sell to city dwellers at a price that could not be known in
9
advance.
Cantillon’s key contribution to the theory of
entrepreneurship was to invest it with some substantive economic
10
content and to identify risk bearing as a constitutive element.
The next major thinker to explore entrepreneurship, and the
one most often credited with elevating the concept to prominence in
economic theory, was the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say. Say
went beyond Cantillon’s focus on uncertainty of income to develop
an account of the entrepreneur who “shifts economic resources out of
an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity and greater
11
yield.” In his pursuit of profit, according to Say, the entrepreneur
figures out how to satisfy a greater number of human needs and
wants.
Entrepreneurship therefore involves not only the
reallocation of existing economic resources but also the generation of
new resources; it is a positive-sum, not a zero-sum, game. Being an
entrepreneur—or a “master-agent,” as Say sometimes described
12
it —“requires a combination of moral qualities, that are not often
found together,” such as “[j]udgment, perseverance, and a

7. Id. For more on the premodern and eighteenth-century development of
the French antecedent, see ROBERT F. HÉBERT & ALBERT N. LINK, THE
ENTREPRENEUR: MAINSTREAM VIEWS AND RADICAL CRITIQUES 17–18, 45–46 (2d
ed. 1988).
8. RICHARD CANTILLON, ESSAI SUR LA NATURE DU COMMERCE EN GÉNÉRAL
388 (Henry Higgs ed. & trans., Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1959) (1755). After
Cantillon’s death in 1734, a group of eighteenth-century economists also living
in France—led by François Quesnay and dubbed by historians “The
Physiocrats”—continued to develop his ideas on entrepreneurship. See HÉBERT
& LINK, supra note 7, at 29–35; Robert L. Formaini, The Engine of Capitalist
Process: Entrepreneurs in Economic Theory, ECON. & FIN. REV., Oct. 2001, at 2,
3–4, available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/efr/2001/efr0104a.pdf.
9. MINTROM, supra note 2, at 72.
10. See HÉBERT & LINK, supra note 7, at 17–28; van Praag, supra note 5, at
313–14.
11. This is management theorist Peter Drucker’s oft-quoted paraphrase of
Say. PETER F. DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 21 (1985).
12. See, e.g., JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY, A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, OR THE
PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, AND CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH 329 (C.R. Prinsep
trans., Sentry Press 1964) (1803).
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knowledge of the world, as well as of business.” Say’s work was
instrumental in identifying the entrepreneur as both a maker of
markets and a creator of economic value, and in painting a picture
of the entrepreneur as a rare, exceptionally talented and motivated
individual. To this day, Say’s basic insights on entrepreneurship
continue to frame much of the academic and popular discussion on
the subject.
Economic theory, however, has not always assigned a place of
prominence to the entrepreneur, and for the most part it still does
14
not. From Adam Smith and David Ricardo on, a venerable line of
classical and neoclassical economists have developed market models
that assign little to no special significance to the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs are largely absent from the economic theory of
Smith—he never uses the term—who elided the distinction between
creators of businesses and owners of businesses and whose depiction
of an “invisible hand” leading to market equilibrium drew attention
15
away from the entrepreneur’s self-consciously generative role.
Neoclassical economists such as Alfred Marshall and A.C. Pigou,
writing at the turn of the twentieth century, and Milton Friedman
and George Stigler, writing in the mid-to-late twentieth century,
have likewise tended to trivialize entrepreneurship in their formal
16
models of a steady-state economy. They have done this, William
13. Id. at 330.
14. On the persistent absence of entrepreneurship from leading graduate
economics textbooks, see Johansson, supra note 2, at 521–30.
15. See ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1981)
(1776). For an argument that Smith did not neglect the entrepreneur and in
fact anticipated Jean-Baptiste Say on this subject, see Peter Hans Matthews &
Andreas Ortmann, An Austrian (Mis)Reads Adam Smith: A Critique of
Rothbard as Intellectual Historian, 14 REV. POL. ECON. 379, 382–83 (2002).
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are two important exceptions to the
claim that British classical economists failed to interrogate the idea of
entrepreneurship, but neither made a lasting contribution to this field. See
HÉBERT & LINK, supra note 7, at 50–56.
16. See MINTROM, supra note 2, at 76–79 (summarizing the neoclassical
model and discussing Alfred Marshall in particular); William J. Baumol,
Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 66 (1968) (“The
references [to entrepreneurship in standard economics texts] are scanty and
more often they are totally absent. The theoretical firm is entrepreneurless—
the Prince of Denmark has been expunged from the discussion of Hamlet.”);
Sherwin Rosen, Austrian and Neoclassical Economics: Any Gains from Trade?,
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1997, at 139, 148–49 (“The fact is that there is no role for
entrepreneurs when economic conditions are ‘given,’ when the list of goods to be
traded is cut and dried, when consumers and producers are clearly identified,
and when resource availabilities are known.”). Of the early neoclassical
economists, Alfred Marshall may have assigned the most substantial role to
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Baumol observes, partly because innovation is an entirely
heterogeneous output that does not lend itself to formal
mathematical description and, more basically, because in the
neoclassical world of perfect information, perfect competition,
negligible transaction costs, and homogeneous goods, entrepreneurs
would have nothing to offer; the concept of entrepreneurship would
17
not even make much sense.
The real world is a rather messy place, though, and the absence
of entrepreneurship certainly looks like a phenomenological lacuna
in the neoclassical view. As neoclassical theory has grown more
sophisticated throughout recent decades—spurred by econometric
and behavioral evidence to recognize the importance of norms and
institutions and the possibilities for imperfect competition,
incomplete information, temporary disequilibria, and irrational
decision making—there are signs that it has begun to reacquaint
18
itself with the entrepreneur. Still, it remains deeply ironic that the
academic discipline most focused on the capitalist process has so
marginalized the entrepreneur, while lawyers, sociologists, and
political scientists cannot stop talking about her.
From a very different critical vantage point than that of Adam
Smith and his ilk, Karl Marx and Max Weber also devoted little
attention to entrepreneurs in their famous theories of capitalism.
Like Smith (and perhaps as a result of Smith), Marx does not draw
a clear distinction between capitalists and entrepreneurs.
19
Capitalists make up a “society of producers,” laborers are “personal
20
materials of commodity production,” and all “third classes of
21
persons” are “unproductive consumers.”
Because capitalist
production follows its own internal laws, there is no room in Marx’s
view for path-breaking entrepreneurship. As sociologist Adrien
entrepreneurs. See HÉBERT & LINK, supra note 7, at 74–77; van Praag, supra
note 5, at 316–19.
17. William J. Baumol, Return of the Invisible Men: The Microeconomic
Value Theory of Inventors and Entrepreneurs 2–3, Paper Presented at the
American Economic Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2006/0107_1015_0301.pdf.
18. For some recent attempts to introduce the entrepreneur into a
neoclassic framework, see MARK CASSON, THE ENTREPRENEUR: AN ECONOMIC
THEORY (1982); Milo Bianchi & Magnus Henrekson, Is Neoclassical Economics
Still
Entrepreneurless?,
58
KYKLOS
353
(2005);
Ying
Lowrey,
U.S. Small Bus. Admin., The Entrepreneur and Entrepreneurship: A
Neoclassical Approach (Jan. 5, 2003) (working paper, http://www.sba.gov
/advo/stats/wkp03yl.pdf).
19. 3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 293 (Samuel
Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Charles Kerr & Co. 1994) (1906).
20. Id. at 44.
21. Id. at 384.
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Taymans has written, in Marx’s entrepreneur “[w]e do not find . . .
the thrilling responsibility of carrying out new methods, of revealing
latent, hitherto untried, possibilities of economic action. We see
only the displacing of masses of capital and surplus-value; no
22
interplay of human actions, but only shifts in proportions.” We see
only parasitic extortion, that is, without any compensating potential
for value-creating innovation. For Marx, the bourgeois entrepreneur
seeks to preserve the economic and sociopolitical status quo, not to
transform it—although in so doing, of course, he unwittingly
facilitates social revolution and the eventual demise of capitalism.
Max Weber touched on entrepreneurship at various points in
23
his writings, but never in much depth.
Perhaps Weber’s most
original contribution to this area was to highlight the deep
ambivalence that societies often feel toward the entrepreneur. In
The Protestant Ethic, Weber observed the emergence in Western
society of a “‘new type’ of entrepreneur,” more intent on making
money and on transforming his surroundings than were his
24
entrepreneurial predecessors.
Although entrepreneurial success
demands “energy and clarity of vision,” “vigor,” and “certain
25
outstanding ‘ethical’ qualities,” according to Weber, many will
resent and resist the entrepreneur’s efforts. “Suspicion, occasionally
hatred, most of all moral indignation”—all “threaten to overwhelm
26
the pioneer.” Writing some years later, in Economy and Society,
Weber further fleshed out his sympathetic conception of the
entrepreneur, portraying him as an outsider from the bureaucracy
who must draw on his imagination to provide the “directing mind”
27
and “moving spirit” behind a new endeavor.
After the early interventions of scholars such as Richard
Cantillon and Jean-Baptiste Say, it was the great Austrian
economist Joseph Schumpeter who made the most profound
contribution to the theory of entrepreneurship and to the public’s
appreciation of the concept. Schumpeter built on Say in developing
the idea of the entrepreneur as innovator, forcing major structural

22. Adrien C. Taymans, Marx’s Theory of the Entrepreneur, 11 AM. J. ECON.
& SOC. 75, 89 (1951).
23. See MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 273–74 (Richard
Swedberg ed., 1999).
24. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE “SPIRIT” OF CAPITALISM
AND OTHER WRITINGS 22–23 (Peter Baehr & Gordon C. Wells eds. & trans.,
Penguin 2002) (1905).
25. Id. at 22.
26. Id.
27. 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 1403 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al.
trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1914).
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changes across markets and industries in a process of “creative
destruction” vital for sustaining a dynamic economy and long-run
28
economic growth. “[T]he function of entrepreneurs,” Schumpeter
maintained, “is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production”
by exploiting a new technology, developing a new source of supply,
29
reorganizing an industry, or the like.
For Schumpeter, the
economy did not tend naturally toward stability and growth through
the workings of an invisible hand, but rather was propelled forward
in sudden leaps by the endogenous innovations of key
entrepreneurs. His was a story not of harmonious stasis but of
evolution through punctuated equilibria. Yet while Schumpeter
30
wrote with great admiration about “the entrepreneurial type,”
motivated primarily not by profit but by the “desire to found a
private dynasty, the will to conquer in a competitive battle, and the
31
joy of creating,” like Weber he recognized that societies often resist
32
the changes that entrepreneurs induce, sometimes violently. (Like
33
Marx, Schumpeter thought capitalism unlikely to survive.) As his
paradoxical label “creative destruction” captured so sharply,
Schumpeter too saw the fundamental public ambivalence that will
attach to entrepreneurship on account of its destabilizing power.
Writing around the same time as Schumpeter, the American
economist Frank Knight conceptualized the entrepreneur’s
contribution in very different and nearly as influential terms.
Whereas Schumpeter largely excluded the assumption of risk and
the duties of ownership from his account of entrepreneurship,
Knight drew on Cantillon in emphasizing the entrepreneur’s role as
a bearer of market uncertainty, as a manager as well as a creator.
Knight famously distinguished between risk, which is related to
recurring events and is insurable, and uncertainty, which derives
28. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
81–86 (2d ed. 1947); see also Robert M. Solow, Heavy Thinker, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 21, 2007, at 48, 49 (asserting that Schumpeter “realized before anyone else
that [creative destruction] was the main source of economic growth” and
characterizing Schumpeter as “the progenitor of a torrent of modern research
that analyzes the dynamics of profit-driven innovation”).
29. SCHUMPETER, supra note 28, at 132.
30. Id.
31. DAVID C. MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY 11 (1967) (quoting
Schumpeter).
32. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 28, at 132 (“To undertake such new things
is difficult and constitutes a distinct economic function, first, because they lie
outside of the routine tasks which everybody understands and, secondly,
because the environment resists in many ways that vary, according to social
conditions, from simple refusal either to finance or to buy a new thing, to
physical attack on the man who tries to produce it.”).
33. Id. at 61.
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from unique events and cannot, Knight claimed, be estimated with
34
any precision. In an economy characterized by changing consumer
tastes and purchasing power, Knight argued, adventurous
entrepreneurs are needed to create, own, and control business
enterprises, guaranteeing wages to their employees in return for the
potential of monetary gain. In an economy riven with uncertainty,
that is, entrepreneurs must address “the primary problem or
35
function [of] deciding what to do and how to do it.”
Entrepreneurship, for Knight, was a kind of profession and a public
service as well as a disposition and a skill set.
Cantillon, Say, Schumpeter, and Knight—these names make up
the canon of entrepreneurial scholarship. Within the last halfcentury,
so
many
commentators
have
written
about
entrepreneurship from so many perspectives that it is difficult even
36
to characterize the state of the literature. A vast crop of empirical
studies have attempted to analyze the relationship between
entrepreneurial activities, government policies relevant thereto, and
economic performance, generally corroborating the commonsense
37
insight that entrepreneurship can facilitate growth. On the theory
side, arguably the two most important critical strands have been
anchored by Israel Kirzner and William Baumol. An Austrianschool economist informed by the work of Freidrich von Hayek and
Ludwig von Mises, Kirzner has posited that the defining feature of
the entrepreneur is not risk taking, innovation, or leadership, but
38
“alertness” to profit opportunities. The Kirznerian entrepreneur is
not a transformative force so much as an arbitrageur who

34. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921).
35. Id. at 268; see also Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the
Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 766–72 (2006) (explicating
and defending Knight’s theory of entrepreneurship); van Praag, supra note 5, at
322–24 (summarizing Knight’s theory in contradistinction to Schumpeter’s).
36. The most ambitious attempt to do so of which I am aware is HÉBERT &
LINK, supra note 7, at 101–60.
37. See, e.g., ANDRÉ VAN STEL, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2006) (“The importance of entrepreneurship for
achieving economic growth in contemporary economies is widely recognized,
both by policy makers and economists.”). For recent contributions that
summarize much of the existing research, see DAVID B. AUDRETSCH ET AL.,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2006); ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
INNOVATION, AND THE GROWTH MECHANISM OF THE FREE-ENTERPRISE ECONOMIES
(Eytan Sheshinski et al. eds., 2007). There are also scores of recent tracts on
how to succeed as an entrepreneur, a genre that does not concern me here.
38. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 68 (1973); see
also HÉBERT & LINK, supra note 7, at 132–34 (summarizing Kirzner’s views on
alertness). See generally KIRZNER, supra; ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION,
OPPORTUNITY AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1979).
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capitalizes on market inefficiencies to earn a profit and move the
market closer to equilibrium (rather than to Schumpeterian
39
disequilibrium).
Further refining this notion are Harvey
Leibenstein, who has argued that pervasive market imperfections
create endless opportunities for entrepreneurial input-completing
40
activity, and Mark Casson, who has argued from within the
neoclassical framework—with the assumption of full information
now relaxed—that entrepreneurs can be defined by their special
access or insights into market data, which enables them to make
41
“judgmental decisions” about the coordination of scarce resources.
Drawing on both Schumpeter and Kirzner, William Baumol has
advanced our understanding of entrepreneurship on many levels but
perhaps most basically by broadening Schumpeter’s notion of
innovation. For Baumol, the entrepreneur is “any member of the
economy whose activities are in some manner novel, and entail the
use of imagination, boldness, ingenuity, leadership, persistence, and
determination in the pursuit of wealth, power, and position, though
42
not necessarily in that order.”
To sum up: although economic theory has been sporadic in its
concern for entrepreneurship, a significant and rapidly growing
body of scholarship has interrogated the subject conceptually and
empirically.
Many have linked entrepreneurship to economic
growth and to a characteristic menu of personality traits. Some
theorists of the entrepreneur, such as Cantillon and Knight, have
emphasized her role in taking on economic risk; others such as
Kirzner and Say her role in making and perfecting markets; others
such as Baumol and Schumpeter her role in generating innovation
and economic value. These theories intersect at many points, clash
at others, and do not form a unified whole. But they provide a
39. Mark Casson characterizes Kirzner as supplementing Schumpeter by
providing an account of the “‘low-level’ entrepreneurship” carried on routinely
by small firms, whereas Schumpeter was focused on the much rarer “‘high-level’
kind of entrepreneurship” that transforms entire industries and societies.
Mark Casson, Entrepreneurship, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Entrepreneurship.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2008).
40. See generally HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, GENERAL X-EFFICIENCY THEORY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1978).
41. CASSON, supra note 18, at 23.
42. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND THE
STRUCTURE OF PAYOFFS 7–8 (1993). Other influential recent efforts to define
entrepreneurship include DRUCKER, supra note 11 (emphasizing the
exploitation of change as an opportunity), and Howard H. Stevenson, A
Perspective on Entrepreneurship, in THE ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURE 7 (William
A. Sahlman et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999) (emphasizing the mobilization of existing
resources in novel ways).
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reasonably rigorous backdrop against which to evaluate the new
forms of “entrepreneurship” that have taken root in the world
beyond economics.
B.

The New Entrepreneurs

In recent years, four main variants on the traditional concept of
entrepreneurship have emerged: social entrepreneurship, policy
entrepreneurship,
norm
entrepreneurship,
and
moral
entrepreneurship. This Section provides a brief sketch of each term,
43
in declining order of prominence.
1.

Social Entrepreneurship

Like its capitalist doppelgänger, social entrepreneurship has
been defined many different ways, not all consonant with each
other. As a recent article in the Stanford Social Innovation
Review—a leading journal in the field founded in 2003—observed,
“the definition of social entrepreneurship today is anything but
clear. As a result, [the term] has become so inclusive that it now
has an immense tent into which all manner of socially beneficial
44
activities fit.” There have been, by my lights, five main variants on
the term, three of which remain in common usage.
First, and most basically, some call a social entrepreneur
anyone who starts a nonprofit organization. This definition may
have the virtue of being clear and parsimonious, but at the price of
banality. Few commentators now embrace such a minimalist
conception.
Second, some identify social entrepreneurship with the publicminded activities of for-profit corporations (activities that may also
be profit minded at the same time).
A firm that uses
43. I know of no precise way to gauge the relative prominence of these
terms. In ranking social entrepreneurship as the most significant lexical
innovation and moral entrepreneurship as the least, I am relying on objective
indicia such as number of references in Google and in academic databases, as
well as my subjective experience of their usage. “Social entrepreneur,” for
example, received 372,000 hits in a Google search conducted on February 1,
2008, while “moral entrepreneur” received only 3570.
44. Roger L. Martin & Sally Osberg, Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for
Definition, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2007, at 29, 30; see also id. at 39
(expressing concern that “indiscriminate use of the term [social
entrepreneurship] may undermine its significance”); Alan Finder, A Subject for
Those Who Want to Make a Difference, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at B9
(observing that “[t]here is not even agreement on precisely how to define the
field” of social entrepreneurship); J. Gregory Dees, The Meaning of “Social
Entrepreneurship”
1
(May
30,
2001),
http://www.caseatduke.org
/documents/dees_sedef.pdf (“Though the concept of ‘social entrepreneurship’ is
gaining popularity, it means different things to different people.”).
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environmentally friendly production methods even though they cost
more or that donates money to a local charity would, by this
definition, be engaging in social entrepreneurship. However, this
set of activities is now typically classified under “corporate social
responsibility,” and as interest in that topic has grown, it has
45
increasingly been seen as a separate domain, leaving social
46
entrepreneurship consigned to the nonprofit sector.
Social
entrepreneurs may earn income to support their good works, but
they may not do good works to support their earning of income.
Third—and now we are onto the definitions with extensive
followings—some associate social entrepreneurship with the efforts
of nonprofit organizations to start profit-making ventures or
otherwise adopt strategies from the for-profit world. Thus, Martha
Minow describes social entrepreneurship as “a new buzzword to
characterize efforts by philanthropists to bring market-style ideas or
47
business accountability methods to philanthropic investment”;
Thomas Kelley equates it with “profit-making, entrepreneurial
charity,” whereby a “growing number of nonprofit charities are
48
adopting the culture and practices of commercial ventures”;
45. See generally Clive Crook, The Good Company, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22,
2005, at S3 (providing a “survey of corporate social responsibility” that
documents the explosive growth of interest in and support for the concept).
46. I should note that many in the social entrepreneurship community,
most significantly the Ashoka organization, strongly dislike the phrase
“nonprofit sector” and prefer to use “citizen sector” or “social sector” instead.
See, e.g., Ashoka: Innovators for the Public, Why “Citizen Sector”?,
http://www.ashoka.org/citizensector (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). Their logic, as I
understand it, is that “nonprofit” implies an aversion to profit making that is
descriptively false and normatively undesirable, and it defines the sector in
negative terms, by reference to what it is not (namely, the for-profit world).
“Citizen sector,” by contrast, is both a much more capacious formulation and
one that carries more positive resonances.
I am quite sympathetic to this argument, but I continue to use “nonprofit
sector” here because of its familiarity and because it better captures the
centrality of mission in determining whether or not an organization will be
eligible for tax-exempt status—a signal distinction in this area. See infra notes
196–198 and accompanying text (discussing the tax privileges afforded by the
U.S. government to organizations that do not distribute residual earnings to
owners).
47. MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC
GOOD 11–12 (2002). Professor Minow goes on to provide illustrations of
“nonprofit innovators seek[ing] alliances with new philanthropists on particular
initiatives and in the use of business methods to address social needs.” Id. at
12–17.
48. Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2463–64 (2005).
Professor Kelley also notes the connection between social entrepreneurship and
“venture philanthropy,” another ascendant buzzword “used to describe private
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Nicholas Kristof writes about social entrepreneurs who “resemble
traditional do-gooders in their yearning to make the world a better
place, but sound like chief executives when they talk about metrics
to assess cost-effectiveness” and in many cases “generate income to
49
finance expansion”; a law review note links social entrepreneurship
50
with the need for social service organizations to “profit or perish”;
and a New York Times article on the subject bears the title, How To
51
Save the World? Treat It Like a Business.
These commentators
envision a nonprofit organization adopting business best practices
and a business mindset, and maybe also starting a for-profit
offshoot, to become more efficient, effective, and sustainable in the
pursuit of its traditional objectives. Old mission, new methods. An
excellent example is a homeless shelter that starts a business to
train and employ its residents and then uses some of the receipts to
finance the shelter.
Fourth, some take social entrepreneurship to be essentially the
same phenomenon as capitalist entrepreneurship, except with a
social, as opposed to a profit-based, motive. J. Gregory Dees,
Director of the Center for the Advancement of Social
Entrepreneurship at Duke University and author of a benchmark
52
paper on the meaning of social entrepreneurship, is a leading
advocate of this view.
Drawing explicitly on the work of
entrepreneurial theorists such as Say and Schumpeter, Dees argues
that social entrepreneurs “are one species in the genus
53
entrepreneur”: the species with a “social mission.” In pursuit of
grant-making foundations’ sharp turn in recent years toward the theory and
practice of the for-profit world.” Id. at 2464.
49. Nicholas D. Kristof, Do-Gooders with Spreadsheets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2007, at A21.
50. Heather Gottry, Note, Profit or Perish: Non-Profit Social Service
Organizations & Social Entrepreneurship, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249
(1999).
51. Emily Eakin, How to Save the World? Treat It Like a Business, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at B7.
52. Dees, supra note 44. It bears noting that Dees’s paper, first posted
online in 1998 and widely regarded as a “seminal” contribution to the field, see,
e.g., Martin & Osberg, supra note 44, at 35, (i) is five pages long, (ii) contains no
citations, and (iii) has never been published in an academic journal. These
features do not necessarily carry any broader implications, but I think they help
illuminate two significant features of the burgeoning literature on social
entrepreneurship: that its most important medium is the Internet (which
makes the content cheaper and more accessible), and that, by the standards of
legal and social-science scholarship, its theorizing is often remarkably thin
(which also makes the content cheaper and more accessible, in the sense that
more readers will be able to engage with it at a lesser investment of time and
mental energy).
53. Dees, supra note 44, at 2. More recently, Dees has lamented that “[t]oo
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this mission, social entrepreneurs serve as “change agents”—
another new buzzword—by addressing social problems in novel and
54
sustained ways and thereby creating “social value.”
Many
commentators who have embraced this definition of social
entrepreneurship invoke Say’s notion of the entrepreneur as
“shift[ing] economic resources out of an area of lower and into an
55
area of higher productivity and greater yield.” (To be precise, this
is management guru Peter Drucker’s paraphrase; although virtually
everyone attributes the quotation to Say, he never, so far as I can
tell, actually said or wrote it.) Say’s notion is attractive here
because it can be adapted to the nonprofit context if one simply
takes “productivity” and “yield” to encompass more than economic
gain.
Finally, some commentators have adopted this last definition
but with an additional wrinkle: to qualify as social entrepreneurship
the activity must not only be entrepreneurial and social in nature,
but also groundbreaking in scale and effect. The most important
proponent of this view, and the most important player in the world
of social entrepreneurship, is an organization called Ashoka:
56
Innovators for the Public.
Ashoka’s social entrepreneurs must
“find what is not working and solve the problem by changing the
system, spreading the solution, and persuading entire societies to
57
take new leaps.” This requirement has the corollary implication
often . . . [people] identify social entrepreneurship with nonprofits generating
earned income,” when really “social entrepreneurship is about
innovation and impact, not income.
This view is well grounded in
entrepreneurship theory . . . .” J. Gregory Dees, Duke Univ. Fuqua Sch. of Bus.
Ctr. for the Advancement of Soc. Entrepreneurship, Social Entrepreneurship Is
About Innovation and Impact, Not Income, http://www.fuqua.duke.edu
/centers/case/articles/1004/corner.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). Other writers
advancing
this
view
include
PETER
C.
BRINCKERHOFF,
SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE ART OF MISSION-BASED VENTURE DEVELOPMENT 1–2
(2000) (positing a related definition, though with greater emphasis on risktaking and “stewardship”), and Martin & Osberg, supra note 44, at 34–35 (“We
believe that the critical distinction between entrepreneurship and social
entrepreneurship lies in the value proposition itself. . . . What distinguishes
social entrepreneurship is the primacy of social benefit . . . .”). Martin and
Osberg contrast social entrepreneurship with social service provision and social
activism, the former of which, they argue, is insufficiently innovative or
ambitious to merit the entrepreneurial label, and the latter of which is
insufficiently direct in its approach to effecting change. Id. at 38–39.
54. Dees, supra note 44, at 4.
55. DRUCKER, supra note 11, at 21.
56. Full disclosure: I did volunteer work for Ashoka throughout college and
still consider several members of its staff to be mentors and friends.
57. Ashoka: Innovators for the Public, What Is a Social Entrepreneur?,
http://www.ashoka.org/social_entrepreneur (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
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that social entrepreneurs will often be “possessed by their ideas,”
exhibiting an all-encompassing commitment to the cause. They will
be, in journalist David Bornstein’s adaptation of the Ashoka creed,
“transformative forces: people . . . who are relentless in the pursuit of
their visions, people who simply will not take ‘no’ for an answer, who
will not give up until they have spread their ideas as far as they
59
possibly can.” In a similar vein, the Schwab Foundation for Social
Entrepreneurship describes the social entrepreneur as “[a]
pragmatic visionary who achieves large scale, systemic and
sustainable social change” through “unwavering belief,” “driving
60
passion,” and “dogged determination.”
The archetypal social
entrepreneur for Ashoka and Schwab, often invoked in their
literature, is Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus, who
conceived of an ingenious plan for providing microcredit to the rural
poor in Bangladesh and then worked tirelessly for decades to refine
61
the scheme and spread it to additional countries. A PowerPoint
slide used by Schwab captures with delightful succinctness this
vision of the social entrepreneur as a saintly yet pragmatic
visionary.
It reads, “Mother Theresa + Richard Branson =
62
Muhammad Yunus.”
While some commentators had used “social entrepreneur”
63
before he did, it appears to have been Bill Drayton, the founder of
58. Id.
59. DAVID BORNSTEIN, HOW TO CHANGE THE WORLD: SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS
AND THE POWER OF NEW IDEAS 1 (2004).
60. Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, What Is Social
Entrepreneurship?, http://www.schwabfound.org/whatis.htm (last visited Feb.
1, 2008).
61. See, e.g., MAXIMILIAN MARTIN, SCHWAB FOUND. FOR SOC.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, THE PROMISE OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 7 (2004),
http://www.schwabfound.org/docs/web/Martin%202004%20CASIN%2017062004
%20final.pdf.
62. Id. at 12.
63. A JSTOR search reveals the term first being used in a form similar to
its modern sense in Robert S. Redmount, Values, Concepts, and the Assessment
of Personal Deviancy, 1961 DUKE L.J. 355, 358. The Canadian sociologist
Raymond Breton tried to give the term some analytic rigor in Raymond Breton,
Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of
Immigrants, 70 AM. J. SOC. 193, 204 (1964), and Albert Breton & Raymond
Breton, An Economic Theory of Social Movements, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 198, 201–
03 (1969). After one more appearance in the 1960s and two in the 1970s, the
term then disappeared until 1991, when articles devoted entirely to the subject
began to appear. See, e.g., Sandra A. Waddock & James E. Post, Social
Entrepreneurs and Catalytic Change, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 393 (1991). In
another sign of how recently social entrepreneurship has emerged as a
mainstream concept, the most exhaustive attempt yet to “chronicle the
conceptual history of the entrepreneur”—published in 1988—contains no
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Ashoka, who both coined the phrase in its modern incarnation and
64
who has done the most to popularize it. A relentless advocate for
his cause, Drayton has served as a meta-social entrepreneur for the
concept and practice of social entrepreneurship. Since 1980, Ashoka
has identified the most promising social entrepreneurs throughout
the world, recognized them with the title of Ashoka Fellow, and
worked to support their projects and to foster public awareness of
65
and enthusiasm for social entrepreneurship.
As Bornstein has
66
chronicled, the story of Ashoka’s phenomenal growth is intimately
linked with the story of social entrepreneurship’s emergence as a
slogan, mentality, and structuring principle for aspiring do-gooders
the world over.
Thousands of students now study and even take degrees in
social entrepreneurship, a vast network of organizations funds and
supports social entrepreneurs, and journalists and academics use
the phrase casually, without explanation.
One particularly
prominent devotee is President George W. Bush, who routinely
invokes the phrase in speeches promoting faith-based charitable
67
initiatives. Drawing on the work of Ashoka and Bornstein, PBS
mention whatsoever of its social variant. HÉBERT & LINK, supra note 7, at xiii.
64. The popular press routinely attributes the term to Drayton, as does
Ashoka itself. See, e.g., SUSAN DAVIS, ASHOKA: INNOVATORS FOR THE PUB., SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: TOWARDS AN ENTREPRENEURIAL CULTURE FOR SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 6 (2002), available at http://www.ashoka.org/files
/yespaper.pdf; Susan J. Cunningham, The Serial Fixer, FORBES ASIA, Mar. 12,
2007, available at http://members.forbes.com/global/2007/0312/048.html; Clare
Goff, The Steady Rise of the “Citizen Sector,” FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 1,
2006,
available
at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9aef1816-a8c7-11da-aeeb0000779e2340.html; Caroline Hsu, Entrepreneur for Social Change, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 2005, at 63, available at http://ashoka.org/files
/USNewsOct05_final_0.pdf; Fintan O’Toole, Ideas That Can Change the World,
IRISH TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at 16, available at http://ashoka.org/files
/Ireland%20Press4-3-07.pdf.
65. Ashoka: Innovators for the Public, About Us, http://www.ashoka.org
/about (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
66. BORNSTEIN, supra note 59, at 11–19, 61–67, 178–82, 256–63.
67. See President George W. Bush, President Highlights Faith-Based
Initiative at Leadership Conference (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/news/releases/2005/03/print/20050301-4.html (“That’s one of my favorite words,
think about it: social entrepreneurship.”). President Bush tends to employ the
phrase in a very loose fashion. A representative example: “Our government
must serve as a spawning ground for social entrepreneurs, many of whom have
heard the call to help a neighbor in need through their religion. We ought to
welcome faith-based programs into our society, not fear them.” President
George W. Bush, Remarks at the Grace Episcopal Church Youth Entertainment
Academy (Mar. 14, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03
/text/20010314-2.html; see also Bush on the Creation of a White House Office
Tied to Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, at A18; Richard W. Stevenson, In
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recently aired a multipart television series presenting fourteen
68
Ashoka Fellows as “The New Heroes” of our time.
Yet perhaps
more than any other single utterance or event, it was Yunus’s
receipt of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize that provided the watershed
moment in social entrepreneurship’s intellectual and etymological
ascent to legitimacy. When the world’s most potent symbolic award
was given to its most noted social entrepreneur, it both crystallized
and valorized the emergence of social entrepreneurship as a major—
69
and mainstream—force in modern society.
2.

Policy Entrepreneurship

The concept of policy entrepreneurship has received more
sustained academic scrutiny than the concept of social
entrepreneurship, but it too has resisted settled definition. Leading
scholars of policy entrepreneurship have observed that “[t]here is no
consensus on the boundaries of the phenomenon and no synthesis of
70
its origins, motivations, or impact on government and citizens.”
Throughout the literature, “the term ‘entrepreneur’ and the concept
of ‘entrepreneurship’ have been applied to diverse actors who engage
in very different activities and perform very different functions in
71
the political system.” Oftentimes, especially in the legal literature,

Order, President Eases Limits on U.S. Aid to Religious Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2002, at A1. Bush even used the phrase in his 2007 State of the Union
Address, in saluting the founder of the Baby Einstein Company. President
George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 2007),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html. Curiously,
I have not seen any mainstream media outlet pick up on the President’s
penchant for this phrase.
68. See PBS, The New Heroes, http://www.pbs.org/opb/thenewheroes (last
visited Feb. 1, 2008).
69. Yunus did not actually use the phrase “social entrepreneurship” in his
acceptance speech, but he did repeatedly reference the idea of a “social
business,” as distinct from a profit-maximizing business. Muhammad Yunus,
Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2006), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace
/laureates/2006/yunus-lecture-en.html.
70. Thomas R. Oliver & Pamela Paul-Shaheen, Translating Ideas into
Actions: Entrepreneurial Leadership in State Health Care Reforms, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 721, 743 (1997).
71. Id. Oliver and Paul-Shaheen review this literature and develop their
own conception of policy entrepreneurship, focusing on the entrepreneur’s
technical and strategic skills. Id. at 743–80. Other notable attempts to provide
a rigorous, synthetic definition of policy entrepreneurship include MINTROM,
supra note 2, at ch. 5; and Nancy C. Roberts & Paula J. King, Policy
Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy Process, 1 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 147 (1991). Mintrom claims in his 2000 study that
“while the term ‘policy entrepreneur’ will be familiar to most political scientists
and policy scholars, until now no effort has been made to construct a theory of
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the phrase “policy entrepreneur” is invoked without any explanation
or references, presumably on the belief that the concept is either
self-explanatory or so well known as to make citation pedantic. Not
infrequently, authors will use “policy” interchangeably with “public,”
72
“political,” “bureaucratic,” “administrative,” or some other variant.
The basic shared understanding of policy entrepreneurs is that
they are “political actors who promote policy ideas” in the hope of
73
effecting change.
On my reading, definitions of policy
entrepreneurship tend to contain four additional glosses.
First, many definitions stress innovation.
The policy
entrepreneur works to “introduce, translate, and implement
74
innovative ideas into public sector practice” or to “establish[] new
75
goals, procedures, organizations, or programs in the public sector.”
Policy entrepreneurs are in this sense active rather than reactive,
“recognized for ‘stimulating more than . . . responding’ to outside
76
political forces.”
Innovation need not entail invention, however.
Many, if not most, policy entrepreneurs do not come up with new
ideas so much as they develop new ways to package, market, and
77
apply old ideas.

policy entrepreneurship.” MINTROM, supra note 2, at 4.
72. See MINTROM, supra note 2, at 70 (“Typically, the terms public
entrepreneur, political entrepreneur, and policy entrepreneur are treated as
interchangeable.”); Roberts & King, supra note 71, at 151 (observing and
critiquing this conflation of terms). Roberts and King are exceptional for
separating out these concepts. In their typology, policy entrepreneurs are the
subset of public entrepreneurs “who work from outside the formal governmental
system” to inspire its reform. Id. at 152.
73. Note, When Do Policy Innovations Spread? Lessons for Advocates of
Lesson-Drawing, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1467, 1481 (2006).
74. Roberts & King, supra note 71, at 152.
75. Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 70, at 744 (providing numerous
citations for works that share this conceptual framework); see also Andrew P.
Morriss et al., Between a Hard Rock and a Hard Place: Politics, Midnight
Regulations and Mining, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 568 n.88 (2003) (defining a
policy entrepreneur as “one who creates new public policies”).
76. ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS
259 (7th ed. 2000) (quoting DAVID E. PRICE, WHO MAKES THE LAWS? CREATIVITY
AND POWER IN SENATE COMMITTEES 297 (1972)).
77. See Thomas R. Oliver, Ideas, Entrepreneurship, and the Politics of
Health Care Reform, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 160, 170 (1991); Sheldon D.
Pollack, A New Dynamics of Tax Policy?, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 61, 74 (1995).
Following Joseph Schumpeter, many economists likewise draw a distinction
between innovation and invention in describing capitalist entrepreneurship.
See, e.g., Solow, supra note 28, at 49 (“Anyone can invent a new product or a
new technique of production. The entrepreneur is the one who first sees its
economic viability, bucks the odds, fights or worms his way into the market,
and eventually wins or loses.”).

W08-POZEN.V2

302

3/19/2008 4:02:30 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Second, policy entrepreneurs attempt to mobilize support for
their idea so as to improve its chances of being translated into
action. This mobilization may involve aggressive fundraising and
78
79
lobbying, strategic use of the media, appeals to widely shared
80
81
values, or efforts to reframe the public debate. Frequently, it will
involve not only advocacy but also what political scientist John
Kingdon calls “brokerage,” in which the entrepreneurs negotiate
among diverse participants and facilitate the “coupling” of problems,
82
solutions, and political allies.
Third, policy entrepreneurs pursue their goals with unusual
83
diligence. They are characterized by an “all-out effort” and a
84
“singular focus”; they “push, push, and push for their proposals or
85
for their conception of problems.” In addition to their time, energy,
and reputation, some policy entrepreneurs will invest their own
financial resources to advance their cause. Ralph Nader offers a
86
prominent recent example.
78. See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement
Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 28–32 (2001) (describing
policy entrepreneurs’ efforts to solicit funds and mobilize resources in the
context of an emergent social movement).
79. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 84 (1986) (describing policy entrepreneurs’ “adroit
use of the media”).
80. See id. (characterizing policy entrepreneurs as “mobiliz[ing] public
support by appealing to widely shared values such as a concern about health,
safety, or environmental preservation and by making opponents seem selfserving and careless of the public interest”); John S. Baker, Jr., United States v.
Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal “Hate Crime” Legislation, 80
B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1199 (2000) (“Policy entrepreneurs must achieve by
emotional appeals what appeals to narrow self-interest cannot. Thus the
rationale for a new policy must be presented in dramatic terms and evoke
powerful symbols in the public’s mind—‘clean air,’ ‘pure water,’ ‘Americanism,’
‘sinister plots,’ ‘tax cheats,’ ‘confiscatory taxes,’ and so on.”).
81. See BRYAN D. JONES, RECONCEIVING DECISION-MAKING IN DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS: ATTENTION, CHOICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 26 (1994) (“[T]he function of
the policy entrepreneur is to frame an issue so as to move it over the threshold
of attention of policymaking institutions.”).
82. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 182–
83 (2d ed. 1995).
83. Cynthia L. Cates & Wayne V. McIntosh, Retail Jurisprudence: The
Judge as Entrepreneur in the Marketplace of Ideas, 11 J.L. & POL. 709, 713
(1995).
84. Thomas R. Oliver, Policy Entrepreneurship in the Social
Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of Managed Care and Managed
Competition, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 701, 714 (2004).
85. KINGDON, supra note 82, at 181.
86. See Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90 YALE L.J. 702, 719
(1981) (book review) (identifying Nader as the “quintessential policy
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Fourth, and perhaps most intriguingly, policy entrepreneurs
exhibit strategic timing. Rather than push for their proposals with
equal vigor at all times, they may lie in wait until the emergence of
87
what Kingdon famously termed a “policy window”: a perceived
crisis, high-salience event, changing of the political guard, or tipping
point in public opinion that opens up new opportunities for reform.
A good policy entrepreneur will have laid a foundation in advance,
“softening up” the relevant policy communities so that she can react
quickly when a window appears to move her issue onto the political
agenda and to convince decision makers to adopt her preferred
88
solution.
Successful policy entrepreneurship thus demands
“excellent antennae” for reading the sociopolitical landscape and
89
identifying possible pressure points. Policy entrepreneurs are in
this sense reactive rather than active.
Outside of these four constitutive elements, scholars seeking to
define policy entrepreneurship appear to disagree on several
important dimensions. First, some scholars would reserve the label
90
for political officials, while others—including the most influential
scholars—would also allow nongovernmental actors to be policy
91
entrepreneurs, and still others would allow only nongovernmental
92
actors to be so deemed. Second, some scholars would reserve the
label for those who have actually succeeded at effecting political
93
change, while others would not impose a success condition. And
entrepreneur”).
87. KINGDON, supra note 82, at 165–95. For an earlier articulation of this
basic idea, see CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 200–11
(1938) (developing a “theory of opportunism” in the political sphere).
88. KINGDON, supra note 82, at 127–31.
89. Id. at 183; see also MINTROM, supra note 2, at 124–29 (stressing the
importance of “social perceptiveness” and “social connectedness” to successful
policy entrepreneurship); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2003)
(synopsizing the “burgeoning literature identif[ying] circumstances giving rise
to ‘political entrepreneurs’”).
90. See Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 70, at 743–44 (summarizing
previous studies of policy entrepreneurship). For an example of a recent legal
article that appears to make this definitional move, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 549, 573 n.101 (2002).
91. See, e.g., KINGDON, supra note 82 at 204 (“[Policy] entrepreneurs are
found at many locations; they might be elected officials, career civil servants,
lobbyists, academics, or journalists. No one type of participant dominates the
pool of entrepreneurs.”); MINTROM, supra note 2, at 57; Oliver & Paul-Shaheen,
supra note 70, at 744.
92. See, e.g., Roberts & King, supra note 71, at 152.
93. See id. at 149–51 (indicating that many previous formulations of policy
entrepreneurship require “implementation” and “institutionalization” of the
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third, some scholars would restrict the definition to those political
actors who are motivated by something beyond their narrow selfinterest—beyond, say, placating an influential interest group or
improving one’s odds of reelection—while others would exclude any
94
motivational component.
The development of policy entrepreneurship as a concept and a
slogan differs from that of social entrepreneurship in a number of
ways.
Unlike social entrepreneurship, the idea of policy
entrepreneurship is not often traced to a single source like Bill
Drayton; it has no comparable founding myth. John Kingdon’s
classic exposition in Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies
95
remains the most cited reference, but he was by no means the first
to explore the phenomenon or to coin the phrase. David Price, Jack
96
Walker, and several others beat him to it by over a decade. Among
political scientists, the phrase was in widespread use by the mid97
1980s; among lawyers, by the mid-1990s. By now, almost everyone
in these disciplines recognizes policy entrepreneurs as important
contributors to the policy process and, therefore, as legitimate
objects of study. Social entrepreneurship, by contrast, never really
made the migration from business journals to law reviews,
appearing in only forty-three legal articles as of February 2008 and

entrepreneur’s idea).
94. Compare, e.g., KINGDON, supra note 82, at 179 (expressing a willingness
to count individuals as policy entrepreneurs regardless of whether they are
seeking “material, purposive, or solidary benefits”), with Oliver & PaulShaheen, supra note 70, at 743–44 (describing prior studies that defined policy
entrepreneurs as “political leaders who are able to take actions free from the
influence of both economic elites and political constituencies,” as governmental
analysts who are seeking to “advance policy objectives,” and as administrators
who wish to blend efficiency with “moral leadership” or to “reorganize and
improve governmental services”).
95. KINGDON, supra note 82. The first edition of Kingdon’s book was
published in 1984.
96. See, e.g., David E. Price, Professionals and “Entrepreneurs”: Staff
Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Committees, 33 J. POL. 316
(1971); Jack L. Walker, Performance Gaps, Policy Research, and Political
Entrepreneurs, 3 POL’Y STUD. J. 112 (1974); see also Oliver & Paul-Shaheen,
supra note 70, at 743–44 (citing to additional sources from the 1970s and
1980s).
97. I base this claim on JSTOR and Westlaw database searches. The
phrase “policy entrepreneur” appears in only a handful of law review articles in
the 1980s, written mostly by professors of political science or government. The
first law review article written by a law professor to apply the term in any
substantial way was Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest:
A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 93–94 (1990). By the end of the 1990s, more than two
hundred law review articles had made use of the term.
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98

analyzed in depth in just one of them.
Moreover, whereas writers seeking to define or understand
social entrepreneurship routinely draw on theories of capitalist
entrepreneurship, however superficially, writers on policy
99
entrepreneurship as a rule do not.
They may draw on the
literatures concerning social change, social movements, political
leadership, public choice theory, and so forth, but almost never do
they seek to glean insight from Say or Schumpeter. Finally,
whereas most commentators have hailed social entrepreneurship as
100
a welcome new development, policy entrepreneurship has received
a cooler reaction. The predominant concern, it seems, is that policy
entrepreneurship does not necessarily advance proposals with the
deepest popular support or normative appeal, but instead introduces
an idiosyncratic, undemocratic, and possibly rent-seeking reform
101
vehicle into the system.
Nevertheless, some have argued that
policy entrepreneurship may represent the only real tool we have to
break out of the public choice paradigm—the only way to circumvent
interest group politics and achieve legislation with widely dispersed
102
benefits and narrowly concentrated costs.
3.

Norm Entrepreneurship

The story of norm entrepreneurship’s rise to academic
prominence is in large part the story of two scholars: Cass Sunstein
and Harold Koh. Professor Sunstein introduced the term to the
98. The forty-three figure comes from the Westlaw Journals and Law
Reviews database. The outlier is Kelley, supra note 48, at 2463–66.
99. Michael Mintrom is the exception that proves the rule. Mintrom makes
a substantial attempt to use theories of capitalist entrepreneurship to inform
his own theory of policy entrepreneurship, MINTROM, supra note 2, at 70–112,
but he notes that in so doing he is breaking from traditional practice, id. at 111,
and is, indeed, running the risk of boring his readers. Id. at 70–71.
100. Most, but not all. While commentators have by and large shown great
enthusiasm for social entrepreneurship, some have expressed apprehensiveness
that it might undermine values such as care and compassion, lead to excessive
privatization of social service provision, and displace forms of desirable yet “oldstyle” charity. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 47, at 28–49; Kelley, supra note 48,
at 2465–66. Some have also challenged social entrepreneurship on conceptual
grounds, questioning whether it represents a coherent or useful category of
activity. See Finder, supra note 44, at B9 (noting that despite social
entrepreneurship’s rapidly growing role in business school curricula, “[s]ome
professors even challenge the idea that it is a legitimate field of inquiry”).
101. See, e.g., Oliver & Paul-Shaheen, supra note 70, at 744–45 (noting that
“some observers caution that the goals, quality of innovations, or personal
ethics of public sector entrepreneurs may be questionable” and discussing the
inevitability of “controversies associated with policy entrepreneurship”
(citations omitted)).
102. See Shaviro, supra note 97, at 93–94.
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legal academy in a 1996 article entitled Social Norms and Social
103
Roles.
In that paper, Sunstein defined norm entrepreneurs as
“people interested in changing social norms,” who, if successful, will
produce “norm bandwagons,” whereby small shifts in norms lead to
larger shifts, and “norm cascades,” whereby society comes to
104
experience a rapid revision of its prevailing norms.
Norm
entrepreneurship is possible, Sunstein contends, because “[e]xisting
105
social conditions are often more fragile than might be supposed.”
Social norms are typically embedded within a matrix of social roles,
social situations, and legal rules, and as a result of collective action
106
problems (e.g., the problems of free riders and “sticky norms” ), risk
aversion, or failure of imagination, these norms may persist even
though many people do not actually support them and may even
despise them.
Norm entrepreneurs “can exploit widespread
dissatisfaction with existing norms”—and thereby move society
toward a new norm—“by (a) signalling their own commitment to
change, (b) creating coalitions, (c) making defiance of the norms
seem or be less costly, and (d) making compliance with new norms
107
seem or be more beneficial.”
Sunstein gives as examples William
Bennett, Jerry Falwell, Louis Farrakhan, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
108
Catharine MacKinnon, and Ronald Reagan.
He suggests that
norm entrepreneurship played an important role in the collapse of
the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Communist regime in
the Soviet Union, and that this helps explain how these political
109
changes could occur so rapidly and yet so peacefully.
Dean Koh’s key advancement on Sunstein’s idea was to take it
global. In an important article published two years after Sunstein’s,
Koh elaborated a theory of how “transnational norm entrepreneurs”
can both catalyze support for new forms of international corrective
action and help “bring international law home” by spurring their
domestic political system to internalize principles of international
110
law.
The scope of their ambitions, Koh observes, requires these

103. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903 (1996).
104. Id. at 909.
105. Id.
106. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving
the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
107. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 929.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 912, 929–30.
110. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 646–55 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing
International Law Home]. The seeds of this thesis can be seen in an article Koh
published the previous year. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
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entrepreneurs to cultivate an array of allies. Transnational norm
entrepreneurs will often seek to enlist “governmental norm
sponsors,” and they will join together with administrative agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, international organizations,
academics, and other actors to form “issue networks” and “epistemic
communities” through which to share ideas, plan strategies, and
111
leverage their influence.
Structuring this transnational
entrepreneurial activity are various “law-declaring fora”—such as
treaty regimes and domestic, regional, and international courts—
that provide interpretive communities within which the
entrepreneurs can “defin[e], elaborat[e] and test[] the definition of
particular norms” and seek to create shared meaning around a new
112
norm.
A particularly rich area for transnational norm
entrepreneurship, and the area of greatest concern to Koh, is
international human rights. As Koh details, this field can claim a
proud history of norm entrepreneurship, from Lord William
Wilberforce and the British Anti-Slavery Society pressing for the
end of the slave trade in the late 1700s, to Christian peace activists
promoting international criminal courts in the early 1800s, to Aung
113
San Suu Kyi protesting the Burmese junta today.
Professor Sunstein and Dean Koh were not, in fact, the first to
use the term norm entrepreneur, nor were they last to give it
definitional content, but their formulations continue to predominate
in the literature (with Sunstein’s more likely to be cited by writers
on law and economics or social norms, and Koh’s by scholars of
international law). An article in an international relations journal
indicates that political scientist John Mueller used the phrase at a
114
conference held in May 1993, and Koh explicitly draws on Ethan
Nadelmann’s definition of “transnational moral entrepreneurs” as
115
well as on Sunstein’s work.
Significant refinements on the norm
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2611–12, 2648 (1997) [hereinafter Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?].
111. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 110, at 648–49.
112. Id. at 649–51.
113. Id. at 647–48.
114. Ann Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 INT’L STUD. Q.
363, 375 n.12 (1996).
115. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 110, at 647.
Nadelmann defines transnational moral entrepreneurs as nongovernmental
organizations or individuals who “mobilize popular opinion and political support
both within their host country and abroad; . . . stimulate and assist in the
creation of like–minded organizations in other countries; and . . . play a
significant role in elevating their objective beyond its identification with the
national interests of their government.”
Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global
Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society, 44 INT’L
ORG. 479, 482 (1990). These entrepreneurs’ efforts “are often directed toward
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entrepreneur concept have been proffered in the years since by
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (emphasizing the
entrepreneurs’ use of means-ends calculations in a process of
116
“strategic social construction”), Eric Posner (modeling a “norm
entrepreneur game” in which entrepreneurs use signaling and focal
117
points to try to change social norms and tastes),
and Robert
Ellickson (distinguishing norm entrepreneurs from “self-motivated
118
leaders” and “opinion leaders”).
While the norm entrepreneurs
invoked in the literature are typically respect-worthy actors
pressing for salutary or at least reasonable changes, Richard Posner
and others have reminded us that “bad-norm entrepreneurs” also
119
compete in this sphere.
persuading foreign audiences, especially foreign elites, that a particular
[normative] regime reflects a widely shared or even universal moral sense,
rather than the particular moral code of one society.” Id. Nadelmann notes
that this notion “conjoins [sociologist Howard] Becker’s concept of ‘moral
entrepreneurs’ and [political scientist Samuel] Huntington’s notion of a
‘transnational organization.’” Id. at 482 n.4 (citing HOWARD S. BECKER,
OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); Samuel P.
Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics, 25 WORLD POL. 333
(1973)). It might be of interest to note that Nadelmann himself turned norm
entrepreneur a few years after writing that article, leaving academia to found
and direct the Drug Policy Alliance, a nonprofit organization devoted to
progressive drug reform. Drug Policy Alliance: Ethan Nadelmann, Executive
Director, http://www.drugpolicy.org/about/keystaff/ethannadelma (last visited
Feb. 1, 2008).
116. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics
and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 910 (1998). With a different co-author,
Sikkink also provided a rich description of the work of transnational norm
entrepreneurs in an influential book published around the same time.
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
117. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 29–32 (2000).
118. Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 1, 10–17 (2001). Each of these actors, in Ellickson’s typology, is a type of
“change agent.”
Norm entrepreneurs are distinctive because they “are
specialists who campaign to change particular norms” (whereas opinion leaders
are generalists) and because they are strongly motivated by external rewards
such as esteem (whereas self-motivated leaders may move to change a norm
even in the absence of potential esteem benefits). Id. at 13–16.
119. See Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic
Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365, 367 (1997) (suggesting dueling as an example
of a bad norm and “aggressive panhandlers, vandals, drunks, junkies,
prostitutes, gang members, loiterers, and other visibly antisocial persons” as
examples of bad-norm entrepreneurs); see also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The
New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of Law,” 101 MICH. L. REV.
2275, 2326–27 (2003) (“Human-rights advocates and scholars who study norms
are fond of using the term ‘norm entrepreneurs’ to describe people such as
Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Mother Teresa. . . . But if Mandela is a norm

W08-POZEN.V2

2008]

3/19/2008 4:02:30 PM

WE ARE ALL ENTREPRENEURS NOW

309

Within the fields of law and, to a lesser extent, political science
and international relations, norm entrepreneurship has become a
120
“wildly popular” concept.
Several hundred law review articles
have employed the term since the new millennium, with authors
applying it to such diverse actors as individuals sharing files on
121
122
Napster,
courts mandating same-sex civil unions,
and
Scandinavian countries pushing for liberal reforms in world
123
politics.
Beyond Sunstein’s and Koh’s fields of behavioral
economics and international law, public choice theorists have also
124
found the idea congenial.
As Sunstein has pointed out a number
of times, anyone interested in the relationship between law and
social norms may have reason to care about norm
125
entrepreneurship.
While norm entrepreneurship has proven a rich source of
inquiry, not everyone agrees on its meaning or its descriptive and

entrepreneur, so is Osama bin Laden, and so are the planners of Palestinian
suicide bombings. So was Slobodan Milosevic, and so were the Hutu leaders . . .
who succeeded in dramatically shifting the normative commitments of several
million Rwandan Hutus.” (citation omitted)); Dorothea Kübler, On the
Regulation of Social Norms, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 455 (2001) (describing
“snob norms”); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 815, 843 (2000) (criticizing “over-zealous norm entrepreneurs” who tread
on others’ personal privacy); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 97 (2000) (discussing “polarization
entrepreneurs”). Julie Mertus adds the observation that whether or not
someone appears a bad-norm or good-norm entrepreneur will often simply be a
matter of subjective belief. Julie Mertus, Considering Nonstate Actors in the
New Millennium: Toward Expanded Participation in Norm Generation and
Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 537, 560 (2000) (“Those seen as
breaching sovereignty norms may be viewed positively as ‘sovereignty-free
actors,’ ‘trans-boundary entities,’ and ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ or they may simply
be called ‘international law-breakers.’”).
120. John Fabian Witt, Narrating Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 303, 306 n.17 (2003); see also Ellickson, supra note 118 at 10 (noting that
“many legal scholars since [Sunstein] have embraced” the phrase).
121. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505,
538–39 (2003).
122. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of
Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1327, 1405–06 (2000).
123. Christine Ingebritsen, Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandanavia’s Role in
World Politics, 37 COOPERATION & CONFLICT 11 (2002).
124. See Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur,
53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2044–46 (2000) (discussing the tendency of public choice
theory to model key government actors “as if they were entrepreneurs”).
125. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2021, 2030–31 (1996).
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predictive utility.
Like social entrepreneurship and policy
entrepreneurship, the term is often used very loosely. There is a
basic divide among its exponents—a divide that no one seems to
have noted—between those who would apply the term only to
126
nongovernmental actors and those who would apply the term to
127
governmental and nongovernmental actors alike. More important,
some observers have begun to express substantive skepticism. Oona
Hathaway, for example, has cautioned that even successful
transnational norm entrepreneurship “can take decades to lead to
128
tangible change,” while Robert Scott has challenged the concept’s
social-scientific pretentions with his cutting remark that norm
129
entrepreneurs “used to be known” as “busybodies.”
More
sustained skepticism emerged following the publication of Eric
130
Posner’s book Law and Social Norms.
Several reviewers
questioned whether norm entrepreneurship can submit to
131
productive formal modeling,
whether there is any systematic
means for understanding why certain people follow certain norm
132
entrepreneurs,
and, indeed, whether the notion of norm
entrepreneurship really advances on more traditional ideas such as
marketing, trend setting, focal points, and tipping points in
133
explaining where norms come from.

126. Harold Koh is the leading advocate of this limitation. See Koh,
Bringing International Law Home, supra note 110, at 647–48 (distinguishing
between transnational norm entrepreneurs and government norm sponsors).
127. This is the larger camp. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 117, at 32–33
(“Government actors can serve as norm entrepreneurs.”); Hetcher, supra note
124, at 2046 (analyzing the Federal Trade Commission as a “website privacy
‘norm entrepreneur’”); Ingebritsen, supra note 123, at 13–21 (considering all of
Scandinavia as a norm entrepreneur in world politics); Sunstein, supra note
103, at 929 (indicating that “political actors, whether public or private” can be
norm entrepreneurs); Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of
Social Norms, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–13 (2005) (describing the U.S.
government as a norm entrepreneur with regard to the regulation of computer
software).
128. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L.J. 1935, 2022 (2002).
129. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1615 (2000).
130. POSNER, supra note 117.
131. See, e.g., Daniel Gilman, Of Fruitcakes and Patriot Games, 90 GEO. L.J.
2387, 2395 (2002).
132. See, e.g., Kristin Madison, Government, Signaling, and Social Norms,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 867, 879–80; Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount
Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 635–36
(2001). Professor Madison suggests that our best hopes here may be sociology
and psychology. Madison, supra, at 880.
133. See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 131, at 2395; Madison, supra note 132, at
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Moral Entrepreneurship

The concept of moral entrepreneurship, like that of norm
entrepreneurship, owes much of its success to two scholars: in this
case, Howard Becker and Richard Posner.
Becker, a highly
regarded sociologist, launched the term in his 1963 book Outsiders:
134
Studies in the Sociology of Deviance.
In that work, Becker
deployed the idea of the moral entrepreneur to help explore the
relationship between law and morality and to explain how deviant
social categories—his primary example of which is the “marihuana
135
user”—become defined and entrenched.
In Becker’s view, there
136
are two “related species” of moral entrepreneur, the rule creator
and the rule enforcer. “The prototype of the rule creator,” Becker
explains, “is the crusading reformer”:
He is interested in the content of rules. The existing rules do
not satisfy him because there is some evil which profoundly
disturbs him. He feels that nothing can be right in the world
until rules are made to correct it. He operates with an
absolute ethic; what he sees is truly and totally evil with no
qualification. Any means is justified to do away with it. The
137
crusader is fervent and righteous, often self-righteous.

Rule creators may be courageous humanitarians, such as the
abolitionists who opposed slavery, but they may also prove
“meddling busybod[ies],” such as the prohibitionists who opposed
138
alcohol. Some rule creators will have a single burning passion and
will cease their moral entrepreneurship once their initial goals are
fulfilled. Others may find they have a taste for moral crusading and
139
will move on to the next cause, becoming serial rule creators.

879–80 & nn.46–48.
134. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE
147–63 (1963).
135. See, e.g., id. at 162 (“Deviance—in the sense I have been using it, of
publicly labeled wrongdoing—is always the result of enterprise. Before any act
can be viewed as deviant, and before any class of people can be labeled and
treated as outsiders for committing the act, someone must have made the rule
which defines the act as deviant.”).
136. Id. at 147.
137. Id. at 147–48.
138. Id. at 148.
139. Id. at 153. Rule enforcers are fundamentally different: they work not to
promulgate new moral standards but to administer those standards once in
place. When police agencies were charged with enforcing the Prohibition Laws
following the Eighteenth Amendment, Becker says, they served as a rule
enforcer for temperance. Id. at 155. It is not at all clear to me why rule
enforcers deserve to be labeled entrepreneurs, and Becker never attempts to
explain or even allude to the entrepreneurial dimension. Subsequent scholars

W08-POZEN.V2

312

3/19/2008 4:02:30 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Richard Posner introduced a somewhat different vision of the
moral entrepreneur in his 1997 Holmes Lectures and subsequent
book The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. For Posner (who
never cites to Becker), moral entrepreneurs are people with “the
140
power to change our moral intuitions.”
They do not do this by
rational argument.
Rather, they mix appeals to self-interest with emotional
appeals that bypass our rational calculating faculty and stir
inarticulable feelings of oneness with or separateness from the
people (or it could be land, or animals) that are to constitute,
or be ejected from, the community that the moral entrepreneur
is trying to create. They teach us to love or hate whom they
141
love or hate.

Posner contrasts the moral entrepreneur with the “academic
moralist,” the moral philosopher who aspires to persuade the masses
142
through reason alone. That aspiration is quixotic and self-serving,
Posner asserts, because the tools of reason do not actually change
people’s behavior—a contention challenged by numerous
143
reviewers —and the “academic cocoon” does not tend to nurture the
who have applied his concept of moral entrepreneurship seem almost always to
have in mind the rule creators. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC
CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 56 (2d
ed. 1986); Randy Lippert, Reply to Tucker, 17 CAN. J. SOC. 191, 191 (1992);
Craig Reinarman, Moral Entrepreneurs and Political Economy: Historical and
Ethnographic Notes on the Construction of the Cocaine Menace, 3 CONTEMP.
CRISES 225 (1979).
140. POSNER, supra note 1, at ix. The core of Posner’s discussion of moral
entrepreneurs in The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (the book) is
lifted from his article, Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1664–68 (1998).
141. POSNER, supra note 1, at 42.
142. Id. at 5, 38–42.
143. See, e.g., Brian E. Butler, Posner’s Problem with Moral Philosophy, 7 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 325, 327–28 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, The Paths to
Legal Equality: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 791, 806–07 (2002);
Ryan Fortson, Problems with Richard Posner’s The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2345, 2355–56 (2001); Charles Fried,
Philosophy Matters, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1741–46 (1998); Frank S. Ravitch,
Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? A Nonfoundationalist Analysis of Richard
Posner’s The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 37 TULSA L. REV. 967,
969–70 (2002).
One reviewer got Posner precisely backwards on this point, but for
interesting reasons. See Ellis Washington, Reply to Judge Richard A. Posner on
the Inseparability of Law and Morality, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 87 (2001)
(“I resent Posner’s characterization of moral philosophers as ‘moral
entrepreneurs.’ This silly name-calling lacks any substantive insight and is
used only to insult or belittle.”). This reviewer was so disturbed at the prospect
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necessary forms of courage, imagination, or polemical skill.
(Catharine MacKinnon is the exception that proves the rule, for she
was denied tenure for many years despite her outsized real-world
144
influence.)
Posner also offers an account of the external factors
that allow for successful moral entrepreneurship.
While he
generally espouses an adaptionist theory of morality, in which a
society’s moral norms are seen as being shaped by its material
needs, Posner notes that “there is often a lag between a change in
material conditions and the adaptation of the moral code to the new
145
conditions.”
Moral entrepreneurs, “like arbitrageurs in the
securities markets,” can exploit this discrepancy to persuade society
146
“to adopt a new, more adaptive code.”
Whereas Becker is most interested in the psychology and
sociology of moral entrepreneurship, Posner thus devotes more
attention to its logical structure, trying to show which forms of
argument can gain traction and at which junctures. Both authors
envision the moral entrepreneur as operating with “an absolute
ethic,” but unlike Becker, Posner seems to make effectiveness a
condition precedent of moral entrepreneurship, as when he notes
that the “unsuccessful [moral entrepreneurs] are apt to be dismissed
147
as cranks.”
Posner is also more explicit that moral entrepreneurs
need not be virtuous actors: Hitler, he says, was a moral
148
entrepreneur just as surely as Jesus Christ or Abraham Lincoln.
Following Becker and Posner, a wide range of scholars have
invoked the concept of moral entrepreneurship. The term has had
greater currency in sociology than in law, partly because of Howard
Becker’s comparatively early influence and partly, I suspect,
because Cass Sunstein’s and Harold Koh’s use of “norm
entrepreneur,” rather than “moral entrepreneur,” shifted attention
149
away from the latter idea.
The interesting question of how norm
of being called an entrepreneur, it seems, that it left him obtuse to the fact that
Posner actually made the opposite characterization—arguing that moral
philosophers are especially unsuited to be moral entrepreneurs—as well as to
the fact that Posner expresses significantly more regard for the latter group.
The resentment felt by this reviewer illustrates how for some audiences,
“entrepreneur” is not a neutral or positively coded label but rather a pejorative.
Cf. supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the less attractive
connotations of “entrepreneur”).
144. POSNER, supra note 1, at 43.
145. Id. at 44.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 42, 44.
149. Dean Koh, recall, drew on both Nadelmann’s idea of “transnational
moral entrepreneurs” and Sunstein’s idea of “norm entrepreneurs” to come up
with “transnational norm entrepreneurs.”
See supra note 110 and
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entrepreneurship relates to moral entrepreneurship has received
surprisingly little attention. Given that social morals are a species
150
of social norms —a distinctive and particularly important species,
perhaps, but still just a species—moral entrepreneurs presumably
constitute a subset of norm entrepreneurs, and the two ideas plainly
have significant conceptual and functional overlap. Yet I have not
seen any writer try to separate out moral entrepreneurship from
norm
entrepreneurship,
much
less
to
explicate
their
interrelationships, and those few writers who have employed both
terms invariably conflate them.
The study of moral
entrepreneurship has developed almost entirely independent of the
study of norm entrepreneurship.
5.

Failed Entrepreneurs

Not all of the new entrepreneur labels advanced in recent years
have had the success of their social, policy, norm, and moral
brethren. Although he hit it big with “norm entrepreneur,” Cass
Sunstein has failed to attract much of a following for several other
151
spinoffs,
including
“availability
entrepreneur,”
“fairness
152
153
entrepreneur,” and “polarization entrepreneur.”
Timur Kuran’s
154
“ethnification entrepreneur” has largely fallen by the wayside.
More conventional formulations such as “cultural entrepreneur,”
“idea entrepreneur,” and “intellectual entrepreneur” have likewise
made little headway in academic, policy, or media debate.
The most significant other semantic variant appears to have
been “intrapreneurship,” which is meant to capture the notion that
employees can be entrepreneurs within an already existing
corporate structure, as by starting a new business unit or developing
a new product. For a time in the mid-1980s, intrapreneurship
accompanying text. As of February 2, 2008, Westlaw shows 125 law review
articles using “moral entrepreneur,” with the vast majority drawing on Becker,
Posner, or Nadelmann. An additional touchstone is Yves Dezalay & Bryant G.
Garth, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International
Justice from the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, 29 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 27 (1995), in which the authors flaunt the term in their title and anticipate
Koh’s globalizing move but never actually offer a definition.
150. See Jane Mansbridge, Starting with Nothing: On the Impossibility of
Grounding Norms Solely in Self-Interest, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND
ORGANIZATION 151, 163 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998).
151. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 687–88, 713–14, 733–35 (1999).
152. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1510 (1998).
153. Sunstein, supra note 119, at 97.
154. Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through
Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 654–55 (1998).

W08-POZEN.V2

2008]

3/19/2008 4:02:30 PM

WE ARE ALL ENTREPRENEURS NOW

315

(sometimes called corporate entrepreneurship) was “the rage”
155
among big U.S. corporations and management publications, and a
156
book bearing its title became a bestseller.
But within a few years
157
the concept came under attack both as a prescriptive proposition
and as a descriptive category. While some business writers continue
to use the term, it does not appear to have made any broader
158
impact.
II.

WHY SO MANY ENTREPRENEURS?

Having summarized the historical origins and current status of
the new entrepreneurs, in this Part I try to adduce several factors
that may have helped motivate, or at least facilitate, the rise of
these terms. I know of no good way to test a causal claim about why
these terms have arisen; my hope is that the factors suggested here
are plausible and illuminating, even if they are admittedly quite
speculative.
A.

Linguistic and Academic Entrepreneurship

Perhaps the most obvious factor to cite in the rise of the new
entrepreneurial buzzwords is the role of key individuals in coining
them and promoting their use—what might be termed linguistic or
academic entrepreneurship. As we saw in the previous Part, Bill
Drayton played this role for social entrepreneurship, Cass Sunstein
and Harold Koh for norm entrepreneurship, and Howard Becker
159
and Richard Posner for moral entrepreneurship.
These widely
respected figures were able to gain an immediate audience for their
neologisms and to imbue them with an immediate intellectual
legitimacy.
Drayton, Sunstein, and Koh, in particular, have
returned to the terms again and again in subsequent years in an
160
effort to impress them upon the public consciousness.
Policy

155. Steven Prokesch, “Intrapreneurship” Raising Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, July
28, 1986, at D1; see also Eric N. Berg, Now “Intrapreneurship” Is Hot, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 1985, at D1.
156. GIFFORD PINCHOT III, INTRAPRENEURING: WHY YOU DON’T HAVE TO LEAVE
THE CORPORATION TO BECOME AN ENTREPRENEUR (1985).
157. See, e.g., Prokesch, supra note 155, at D1 (“[W]hile only two to three
years ago, business publications and management experts were touting
intrapreneurship as the way for American corporations to foster innovation and
regain their competitive edge, such respected publications as the Harvard
Business Review are now running articles on intrapreneurship gone awry.”).
158. The Westlaw Journals and Law Reviews database, for example, shows
only eight legal articles ever mentioning the term, and none using it in any
significant way.
159. See supra Part I.
160. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?,
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entrepreneurship is the outlier for not having a clear founder. Many
associate the term with John Kingdon and David Price, but neither
asserted the term as his own. Social entrepreneurship is the outlier
for first developing outside university walls and only afterwards, in
the late 1990s, becoming a subject of academic scrutiny. From the
start, Drayton aimed Ashoka’s resources at a global audience, and to
this day social entrepreneurship remains the only new buzzword
with a broad following among the general public as well as
professors.
Other features of the buzzwords themselves can help explain
their popularity. First, each term is expansive. Drayton, Sunstein,
Koh, Becker, Posner, Kingdon, and other early adopters of the terms
did not provide highly rigorous definitions, but instead sketched a
core meaning, supplemented by anecdotal illustrations. Thus,
Drayton tells us that social entrepreneurs must “find what is not
working and solve the problem by changing the system, spreading
the solution, and persuading entire societies to take new leaps,” and
lists Susan B. Anthony, Florence Nightingale, John Muir, and
161
others as historical examples.
Kingdon explains how policy
entrepreneurs can exploit policy windows through persistence,
“coupling” skills, and “excellent antennae,” and lists Ralph Nader
162
and Senator Pete Domenici, among others.
Cass Sunstein tells us
that norm entrepreneurs use signaling and coalition-building to
make defiance of the old norms “seem or be less costly,” and points
163
to figures such as Jerry Falwell and Catharine MacKinnon.
Howard Becker gives a psychological profile of the rule creator and
164
illustrates with a discussion of the Prohibition movement. In all of
these cases, the linguistic entrepreneurs defined their targets at
such a high level of generality as to sweep in a great range of
possible actors and activities.
Social entrepreneurship, policy
entrepreneurship, and their ilk have become so popular, I am
suggesting, in part because no one knows precisely what they mean.
This helps explain why commentators have felt licensed to
deploy these concepts so loosely, almost never providing an explicit
165
argument as to why a particular actor or activity merits the label.
81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1145–46 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism,
17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 211 (2006); Ashoka: Innovators for the Public,
The
Entrepreneur’s
Revolution
and
You
(Aug.
2,
2000),
http://www.ashoka.org/entrepreneurrevolution.
161. Ashoka: Innovators for the Public, supra note 57.
162. KINGDON, supra note 82, at 179–83.
163. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 929.
164. BECKER, supra note 134, at 147–55.
165. For examples of such looseness around each of the terms, see supra
notes 44, 52, 70–72, 126–129, 148 and accompanying text.
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It helps explain why more careful scholars disagree so
fundamentally about what each concept means—and why these
disagreements are rarely identified or discussed. It helps explain
how Martin Luther King, Jr. can be a social, policy, norm, and moral
166
entrepreneur at the same time.
It helps explain how it is possible
that no one has explored the overlap between norm
167
entrepreneurship and moral entrepreneurship.
And it helps
explain why other attempts at new buzzwords, such as “availability
entrepreneur” and “ethnification entrepreneur,” have not been able
168
to gain a following.
These failed neologisms are, in virtue of their
very titles, too specific: they force the author and reader to make a
considered judgment about whether the label really does describe
the subject in question. By contrast, the vagueness of the successful
new entrepreneurial buzzwords makes them catchier and more
universal, and it lowers the cost of adoption because users never
have to make a strong affirmative commitment to any specific
definitional content. If I call Senator X a policy entrepreneur or
activist Y a moral entrepreneur, I can be confident that most
listeners will not feel compelled to interrogate these classifications—
and that even if they do, they will have little to go on.
There is also an interdisciplinary dimension to the new
entrepreneurs. Writers on social entrepreneurship routinely draw
on economic theories of capitalist enterprise and social histories of
reform movements to explicate and justify the work of social
entrepreneurs.
Political scientists writing about policy
entrepreneurship have drawn on different strands within their
discipline—including public choice theory, institutionalism, and
process-focused schools—and thereby made the concept an
especially attractive export to the legal academy, where students of
regulation, legislation, and governance have gravitated to the term.
Cass Sunstein situated his account of norm entrepreneurship within
a broader project of exploring the relationship between social norms,
behavioral economics, and the law, and Harold Koh connected his
account to a broader theory of international relations and
transnational legal process. Howard Becker combined psychology,
sociology, and law in devising a theory of moral entrepreneurship,
and Richard Posner developed his own version in light of moral
philosophy and economic analysis.
From the beginning, then, the new entrepreneurial concepts
have been linked with a particular field—social entrepreneurship
with business, policy entrepreneurship with political science, norm
166. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part I.B.4 (final paragraph).
168. See supra Part I.B.5.
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entrepreneurship with law, moral entrepreneurship with sociology—
yet constructed so as to bridge disciplines, making them accessible
to more researchers and opening up new frontiers for original
scholarship. The speed and intensity with which the phrases have
emerged both reflects and, in turn, facilitates the increasingly
interdisciplinary character of social science scholarship. It also
reflects the growing ease with which English-speaking
commentators use market rhetoric to describe seemingly noneconomic
areas
of
human
endeavor.
While
“moral
entrepreneurship” may sound paradoxical to some (how can an
entrepreneur be moral? how can morals be commodified?) it has
proven a magnetic formulation, I suspect, precisely because of this
striking juxtaposition. Public choice, behavioral economics, and law
and economics scholars have already analyzed so much of our
collective lives in economic terms that calling these activities
“entrepreneurial” has lost its power to offend; the pervasiveness of
the capitalist paradigm has already, as Kingdon might say,
169
“softened up” the audience and disarmed its critical instincts. Far
from offending them, the entrepreneurial label will entice many
readers with the promise of deepening our understanding of the
activities and perhaps even subjecting them to formal analysis.
The new entrepreneurial buzzwords, moreover, jibe well with
other broad linguistic and intellectual trends. In the United States
and elsewhere, “[t]he idea of participatory democracy has become
increasingly trendy” ever since the protest movements of the 1960s,
and it has been further stimulated by technological changes such as
the advent of the Internet that allow the public to be more politically
engaged and to communicate more easily with their
170
representatives. Equally trendy notions of deliberative democracy
and communitarianism likewise suggest an active role for the
private citizen in publicly articulating and fighting for her own
preferred policies, norms, and morals. I do not mean to assert here
that the Western world really has come to feature greater amounts
of
participatory
democracy,
deliberative
democracy,
or
communitarian activity in the past several decades, although that
169. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
170. Jonathan Macey, Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: Corporations
and Capital Markets, 115 YALE L.J. 2416, 2425–26 (2006); see also Martin
Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and
Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 369 (2001) (“[N]ow everyone, or
at least potentially everyone, is also seen as a participant in the collective
decision-making process. Today, elected and nonelected government officers,
nongovernmental organizations, political parties, interest groups, policy
entrepreneurs, ‘epistemic communities,’ and ‘networks’ are all relevant actors in
the decision-making processes that produce government action.”).
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may be the case. I am asserting that as ideas such as these have
become more salient, it has given commentators a new vocabulary
and a new set of intellectual tools with which to explore the
relationship of social, policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurship to a
well-functioning democratic order.
Participatory democracy,
deliberative democracy, and communitarianism each imagines a
vibrant, ceaselessly contested public sphere within which the new
entrepreneurs can prod and persuade their compatriots.
Linguistic entrepreneurship has a straightforward incentive
structure. All intellectuals stand to gain a reputational benefit from
coining a lasting neologism: Howard Becker will continue to be
relevant, and to be cited, so long as “moral entrepreneur” remains in
common currency. The example of Becker, Sunstein, and the others
suggests that professors may be more likely to succeed as linguistic
entrepreneurs when they are themselves already established
interdisciplinarians—and therefore well-positioned to forge new
methodological and substantive connections and to gain the
attention of diverse audiences—and when their new terms can be
171
harmonized with multiple intellectual movements.
B.

Basking in the Entrepreneurial Glow

Another
entrepreneurs
capture some
entrepreneur

factor
is the
of the
label.

explaining the emergence of the new
desire, among certain groups of users, to
positive connotations associated with the
The entrepreneur, as alluded to earlier,

171. More speculatively, I wonder if a consciousness of the “decline” of the
public intellectual—a topic probed in depth in RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC
INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (rev. 2d ed. 2003)—has informed the move
among academics to see an expanding range of actors as entrepreneurs.
Intellectuals in America today, it seems to me, have taken on increasingly
entrepreneurial routines in pursuit of an audience. Professors and journalists
maintain websites and blogs on which they pitch their own work; scholarly
merit is measured by number of Social Science Research Network downloads,
see, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN
to Measure Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L.J. 83 (2006); and aspiring
professors are encouraged to cultivate “the art of winning [the] academic game,”
MoneyLaw, http://money-law.blogspot.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
A
thoughtful and accomplished friend of mine recently expressed concern that by
not writing enough op-eds and magazine pieces, I was hurting my “brand.” (I
had been unaware that I had any brand to hurt.) As more and more would-be
public intellectuals have incorporated an entrepreneurial dimension into their
own work, perhaps it has made them more receptive to the notion of
entrepreneurship operating in the realms of philanthropy, policy, norms, and
morals. I wonder, moreover, if the term “intellectual entrepreneur” has not
caught on simply because intellectuals as a group are not yet ready to embrace
this conception of themselves.
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occupies a special place in the American popular understanding of
172
capitalism and of itself.
She plays a key role in our narrative of
settling the frontier (think, most recently, of Silicon Valley), in our
belief in Americans’ ingenuity and pioneering spirit (think of
Benjamin Franklin), in our notion of America as the land of
opportunity (think of Horatio Alger), and in our dual commitments
to small government and to economic growth. She has attained a
kind of mythic stature. Joseph Campbell, the anthropologist who
famously synthesized hero myths across premodern cultures, once
173
called the entrepreneur the “real hero” in American society.
The
Small Business Administration lists among its guiding principles
the goals of “developing and supporting entrepreneurs” and
“empower[ing] the spirit of entrepreneurship within every
174
community to promote and realize the American dream.”
Bill
Gates, Warren Buffett, and other self-made billionaires routinely
capture headlines. American dictionaries equate entrepreneurs
with explorers, heroes, knights, organizers, pioneers, producers,
175
romantics, undertakers, venturers, and voyagers.
The desire to capitalize on entrepreneurship’s positive
connotations has exerted the strongest influence, by far, among
proponents of social entrepreneurship—the only one of the new
buzzwords not coined by an academic, the only one whose theorists
routinely draw the comparison to capitalist entrepreneurship, and
the only one whose users routinely claim the label for themselves,
not just for others. Aspiring nonprofit-sector innovators often say
they are social entrepreneurs; no one ever professes to be a norm
entrepreneur. As many have documented, and as advocates of social
entrepreneurship like to point out, “the [nonprofit] world has
176
changed” dramatically in recent years.
Social entrepreneurship
gurus J. Gregory Dees and Peter Economy make the common case
that
[m]ore than ever, nonprofit leaders need to be entrepreneurs.
As any leader in the nonprofit sector knows, the job of running

172. See supra text accompanying notes 3–5.
173. See Cyril Morong, The Creative-Destroyers: Are Entrepreneurs
Mythological
Heroes?
2
(July
1992),
http://www.geocities.com
/cyrilmorong@sbcglobal.net/ENTREPRENEUR.doc (quoting a 1991 radio
interview with Campbell).
174. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Guiding Principles, http://www.sba.gov
/aboutsba/principles/index.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
175. See supra note 5 (listing synonyms for “entrepreneur”).
176. See, e.g., BRINCKERHOFF, supra note 53, at 3; Jeffrey Soderborg, Social
Entrepreneurship (June 2005), http://www.celcee.edu/publications/digest/Dig0504.html.
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a nonprofit organization has becoming increasingly
complicated. . . . Nonprofit leaders face government funding
cuts, rising demands for performance measures by
foundations, corporations that want strategic benefits from
their philanthropy, new forms of competition from the
business sector, and serious questions about the effectiveness
and appropriateness of traditional charitable remedies for
177
social problems.

Old-style charity is out. Performance metrics, business jargon,
“venture philanthropy,” collaboration with for-profit partners, and
cost savings are in. In this climate of skepticism about the efficacy
and efficiency of traditional charity, those who want to promote a
robust vision of the nonprofit sector have an added incentive to
appropriate the entrepreneurial label. This dynamic then feeds
itself; as more and more nonprofit executives claim to be social
entrepreneurs and more and more business writers celebrate the
concept, the riskier it becomes for an organization not to present
178
itself thus.
President Bush’s affection for social entrepreneurship, or at
179
least for the phrase, fits nicely with this account.
As exemplified
by his founding of the White House Office of Faith-Based and
177. J. GREGORY DEES ET AL., ENTERPRISING NONPROFITS: A TOOLKIT FOR
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS 1 (2001). In a similar vein, Thomas Kelley writes:
Faced with increasing competition for donations and public funds, and
under pressure from philanthropic foundations, a growing number of
nonprofit charities are adopting the culture and practices of
commercial ventures. Twenty years ago the word “entrepreneur” did
not exist in the world of charities. Now nonprofits “identify their
market niches, to maximize their comparative advantages, to think of
their clients as customers, to devise marketing plans, and to engage in
strategic planning.” They worry to an ever-greater extent about
measurable outcomes and impact, assessing their performance, and
demonstrating their cost-effectiveness.
Kelley, supra note 48, at 2463 (quoting Dennis R. Young & Lester M. Salamon,
Commercialization, Social Ventures, and For-Profit Competition, in THE STATE
OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 423, 437 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (citations
omitted)).
178. While the rise of “social entrepreneurship” has thus been spurred by dogooders wishing to claim the entrepreneur mantle, it has also been abetted by
more traditional entrepreneurs wishing to claim a social dimension to their
work. Mark Casson observes of the United Kingdom that “some of the people
[who call themselves] ‘social entrepreneurs’ are actually quite ruthless
businessmen who are going after a market in public subsidies.” E-mail from
Mark Casson, Professor of Economics, University of Reading, to David Pozen
(July 18, 2007) (on file with author). Both of the words in “social entrepreneur,”
it seems, may be invoked opportunistically.
179. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing President Bush’s
frequent use of “social entrepreneur” in public remarks).

W08-POZEN.V2

322

3/19/2008 4:02:30 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Community Initiatives (query: does that make him a social
entrepreneur, a policy entrepreneur, a norm entrepreneur, a moral
entrepreneur, or all of the above?), Bush has been a strong
proponent of devolving social service provision from the government
180
to the nonprofit sector.
At the same time, he has often expressed
pride in the American entrepreneurial spirit and distaste for its
181
perceived
nemesis,
government
regulation.
Social
entrepreneurship allows Bush to marry these themes. It gives him
a phrase with which to valorize the private efforts of charitable
leaders, to link these efforts with capitalist enterprise and economic
growth, and to implicitly undermine those welfarist efforts that are
not entrepreneurial in nature: most obviously, governmental efforts.
Social entrepreneurship, for Bush, represents both a descriptive
vision of how the nonprofit sector achieves new goals and a
normative vision of how the country ought to approach its social
problems.
It is not only social entrepreneurship that benefits from the
connection to capitalist entrepreneurship. As noted in Section I.B
above, scholars of policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurship almost
never unpack the market metaphor and explain how exactly these
activities relate to more traditional entrepreneurship. So why don’t
these scholars give their protagonists another name—leaders,
innovators, transformers, change agents, or what have you—that
would not beg the question of whether the descriptor makes any
sense in a non-economic context? Consciously or subconsciously, I
think part of the reason why Kingdon, Price, Sunstein, Koh, Becker,
and Posner chose “entrepreneur,” and why others followed suit, was
to capitalize on its stature. This is not to say that they wanted all
policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurs to command respect; the
authors are clear that some of these actors will be self-serving, if not
monstrous. But it is to say that in choosing the entrepreneur label,
the authors and their followers tapped into a term that brings with
it a rich array of associations, a certain amount of gravitas, and a
greater likelihood of attracting attention.
C.

Entrepreneur-Friendly External Developments

The last major factor driving the rise of the new entrepreneurs
that I want to highlight is the most sweeping: changes to society
that have made extra-economic entrepreneurship increasingly
viable for an increasing number of actors. The argument here is
180. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, President Highlights FaithBased
Initiative
at
Leadership
Conference
(Mar.
1,
2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/print/20050301-4.html.
181. Id.
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that “social entrepreneurship,” “policy entrepreneurship,” “norm
entrepreneurship,” and “moral entrepreneurship” have caught on in
part because more of these activities happen than ever before.
Linguistic change has to some extent tracked real-world change; the
spread of the entrepreneur meme is to some extent epiphenomenal.
It is for another paper to try to substantiate this claim
empirically, but a number of well-documented external
developments seem to imply an enhanced scope for new forms of
entrepreneurial activity. Consider, first, the rise of the nonprofit
sector. Over the past several decades, the world has witnessed a
182
“global associational revolution,”
in which American nonprofit
183
184
organizations,
foreign
nonprofit
organizations,
and
185
transnational
nonprofit
organizations
have
increased
186
exponentially in number and degree of interconnectedness.
In
some regions, most notably the former Soviet bloc, independent
187
nonprofit sectors are thriving for the first time.
These
developments are not only the product of social entrepreneurship,
whereby countless pioneering figures have founded new
182. This term was coined by Lester Salamon, the nonprofit scholar who has
most assiduously documented the revolution. See Lester M. Salamon, The Rise
of the Nonprofit Sector, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 1994, at 109, 109 [hereinafter
Salamon, Nonprofit Sector]; Lester M. Salamon et al., Civil Society in
Comparative Perspective, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS OF THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 3, 4 (Lester M. Salamon et al. eds., 1999).
183. See DARRYLL K. JONES ET AL., THE TAX LAW OF CHARITIES AND OTHER
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, QUESTIONS AND ACTIVITIES 6–7
(2003) (indicating that U.S. charitable organizations experienced 300% growth
in assets and revenues from 1975 to 1995, as compared to 74% GDP growth in
the same period).
184. See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at
50, 52–54 (providing an overview of foreign nonprofit proliferation); Salamon,
Nonprofit Sector, supra note 182, at 109–12 (same).
185. See DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS
AND CULTURE 54 fig.1.1 (1999) (reporting that the number of international
nongovernmental organizations increased from roughly 100 in 1960 to roughly
5500 in 1996).
186. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 116, at 10–11 (describing the
growth of transnational advocacy networks); LESTER M. SALAMON, THE
RESILIENT SECTOR: THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 71–72 (2003) (same);
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992) (describing transnational epistemic
communities). See generally LESTER M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, THE
EMERGING SECTOR: AN OVERVIEW (1996) (outlining postwar developments in the
global role of the nonprofit sector).
187. See generally GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 182, at chs. 14–18;
DANIEL SIEGEL & JENNY YANCEY, THE REBIRTH OF CIVIL SOCIETY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE
ROLE OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE (1992).
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organizations; they are vital for nurturing social entrepreneurship
as well. Especially in less developed countries, the rise of the
nonprofit sector has created an institutional and financial
infrastructure, a professional network, a governmental buffer, and a
perception of legitimacy that together make it far easier for today’s
social entrepreneurs to pursue their initiatives than it was for their
predecessors.
The rise of the nonprofit sector is also relevant for the other new
entrepreneurs. As the scholars profiled above have shown, advocacy
groups can play a significant role as policy entrepreneurs, norm
entrepreneurs, and moral entrepreneurs—be it Ralph Nader’s
Raiders pushing for consumer safety regulation, Green Peace
pushing for expanded environmental consciousness, or evangelical
churches pushing for Christian moral principles. Harold Koh’s
account of transnational norm entrepreneurship, in particular,
assigns advocacy groups a central place in moving societies toward
188
new foreign policies and new conceptions of international law.
Of course, this global associational revolution is not itself an
endogenous phenomenon, but rather is the product of many
interrelated social changes.
In his study of leading social
entrepreneurs, David Bornstein provides the basic list. On the
supply side: authoritarian governments have ceded to democracies
in some countries, creating new space for civic engagement; greater
prosperity has generated funds for more projects and employees;
health improvements have allowed people to live longer and to focus
on more than just staying alive; educational improvements have
given people skills and ideas with which to address social problems;
women’s movements and civil rights movements have opened up the
public sphere to previously marginalized groups; and new
technologies have dramatically decreased the costs of learning
189
about, traveling to, and interacting with others around the globe.
People today, in short, have more “freedom, time, wealth, health,
exposure, social mobility, and confidence to address social problems
190
in bold new ways.”
At the same time, Bornstein argues, there has
been a surge in demand for social entrepreneurship on account of a
communications revolution that has heightened awareness of social
problems and enabled joint responses, a stagnating public sector in
much of the world that has lowered confidence in state solutions,
and a nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) movement that has
given social entrepreneurship unprecedented credibility and

188. See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 110, at 647–49.
189. BORNSTEIN, supra note 59, at 6–7, 267–68.
190. Id. at 7.
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191

whetted people’s appetite for more.
These developments are plainly bound up with the global rise of
social entrepreneurship as a practice and ideal; I think they are also
relevant for policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurship. At the same
time that these developments have empowered more non-state
actors to address social problems directly, through new products and
services, they have also empowered more actors to address social
problems indirectly, through appeals to government officials and
public opinion. Moreover, by destabilizing the prevailing social
structures, these developments have inevitably called into question
the prevailing social norms as well. As Richard Posner notes, “we
usually find successful examples of moral entrepreneurship in
192
periods or places of crisis, flux, or transition.”
In the United States, these arguments might seem to have less
bite, given that we have long possessed one of the world’s most
193
vibrant, pluralistic, and well-funded nonprofit sectors.
Yet there
are many other features of American life that might suggest—
superficially, at least—that this country offers an especially
congenial environment for all four of the new forms of
entrepreneurship.
Our national romance with the capitalist
entrepreneur lends a background legitimacy to private efforts to
194
pioneer a new way of doing or thinking about things. The dot-com
boom that swept the 1990s and the cult of the CEO that arose in the
195
1980s have lent today’s entrepreneurs an additional cachet.
No
other tax code is as generous as ours to its nonprofit organizations
196
or, consequently, to its social entrepreneurs.
Many nonprofits are

191. Id. at 7–10, 267–68.
192. POSNER, supra note 1, at 44.
193. See John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 267
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (describing the
“extraordinary—probably unique—centrality of the nonprofit sector in
American social and economic life”).
No country has more nonprofit
organizations, employees, or expenditures than the United States, though in
four countries, nonprofits command a higher percentage share of total
employment. S. Wojciech Sokolowski & Lester M. Salamon, The United States,
in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 182, at 261, 266 fig.13.4.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 172–75 (explaining the
entrepreneur’s place of pride in the American imagination).
195. See Pagan Kennedy, The Enlightened M.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004,
at 4A-13 (linking the emergence of social entrepreneurship with the 1990s
having been “a heyday for [capitalist] entrepreneurs”); O’Kelley, supra note 35,
at 755 (“This most recent [post-1980] era of free market ideological dominance
has seen a rekindling of the cult of the entrepreneur primarily in the form of
the modern CEO.”).
196. See Simon et al., supra note 193, at 267.
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exempt from income, property, sales, and franchise taxes at all
levels of government; contributions to charities may be deductible
under state and federal income, gift, and estate taxes; and section
197
501(c)(3) nonprofits are allowed to issue tax-exempt bonds.
These
laws are not necessarily good for policy entrepreneurship, given that
charities risk losing their preferred tax-status if they engage in
198
substantial political lobbying.
But they are good for social, norm,
and moral entrepreneurship, presumably, in that they allow
nonprofit organizations the funds to do more of it.
Within the political arena, our liberal campaign finance laws,
surfeit of interest group lobbyists, and two-party system create
strong incentives for policy entrepreneurship. A parliamentary
regime or a regime of multi-party proportional representation would
not provide as many opportunities for individual politicians to
initiate new legislation outside of a broad-based coalition. (Political
parties in these regimes may have just as much or even greater
scope to innovate, but the individual legislator is more constrained.)
Our First Amendment protections insulate most would-be social,
policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurs from legal or political
reprisal. Compared to the Old World countries of Europe, our
relatively heterogeneous, rootless, consumerist culture would appear
to be more susceptible to the suasions of new ideas and new
199
values.
Our relatively strong embrace of laissez-faire capitalism,
meanwhile, might seem consistent with the idea of seeing additional
areas of our lives in market terms. Given that the United States
possesses such a strong ethic of entrepreneurship and seems to
provide so many outlets and supports for its social, policy, norm, and
moral applications, it is perhaps unsurprising that it has been
American thinkers, to a person, who have spearheaded the study of
the new entrepreneurs.

197. Nonprofit organizations also receive many lesser tax privileges. For a
thorough discussion of their tax treatment, see generally JAMES J. FISHMAN &
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS pts. 3–4
(3d ed. 2006), and Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by
Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85 (1993).
198. See generally Simon et al., supra note 193, at 284–88 (reviewing the
major nonprofit tax regulations aimed at patrolling the “government border”).
199. On the other hand, to the extent that successful moral
entrepreneurship requires not only attractive arguments but also a stirring
personal example, the United States’ legal and cultural permissiveness may
work against it. Richard Posner has suggested that “[l]iberal democracy makes
it difficult for anyone to be a moral entrepreneur because by tolerating
dissenters it makes it difficult for them to prove their courage and thus cut an
inspiring figure.” POSNER, supra note 1, at 81.
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III. STRETCHING ENTREPRENEURSHIP TO ITS LIMITS
Having documented the rise of the new entrepreneurs and
explored some possible causal factors, we are now in a position to
circle back to the original, capitalist entrepreneur from whom these
recent permutations were derived. In this Part, I move from the
descriptive/diagnostic to the evaluative and offer some thoughts on
what is gained and lost by calling so many actors “entrepreneurs.”
The market metaphor, I will suggest, is misleading on a number of
levels but nevertheless captures some distinctive features of the
phenomena being described.
A.

But Are They Really Entrepreneurs?

In what sense are social entrepreneurs, policy entrepreneurs,
norm entrepreneurs, and moral entrepreneurs comparable to
capitalist entrepreneurs? Although scholars of these subjects rarely
address this question head on, the basic answer seems to be that all
of these actors serve as “change agents” within their respective
200
market niches.
Just as a person with an innovative technology
can transform, say, the pharmaceutical industry, a person with an
innovative argument can transform how society regulates or
conceptualizes the provision of pharmaceuticals. While this analogy
is coherent at a very general level, it elides several important
differences between the activities of the capitalist entrepreneur and
the activities of her non-capitalist counterparts.
First, capitalist entrepreneurship is characterized by a greater
role for risk. Although economic theorists have disagreed over
whether risk-bearing is the defining characteristic of the
entrepreneur, from as far back as Richard Cantillon they have
201
identified risk-bearing as a defining characteristic.
The
entrepreneur accepts a lower assured income and, often, the
possibility of personal ruin in exchange for the potential to realize
above-average future economic gain. In practice, the vast majority
202
of entrepreneurs never fulfill this potential.
The new
200. See, e.g., MINTROM, supra note 2, at 57–59 (describing policy
entrepreneurs as “change agents”); Ellickson, supra note 118, at 10–17 (same
for norm entrepreneurs); J. Cunyon Gordon, Painting By Numbers: “And, Um,
Let’s Have a Black Lawyer Sit at Our Table,” 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1257, 1289–
90 (2003) (same for moral entrepreneurs); Ashoka: Innovators for the Public,
supra note 58 (same for social entrepreneurs); Dees, supra note 44, at 4 (same
for social entrepreneurs).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10 (summarizing Cantillon’s
views); see also MINTROM, supra note 2, at 154 (discussing this debate within
the canonical economic literature on entrepreneurship).
202. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing entrepreneurial
failure rates in modern America).
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entrepreneurs, by contrast, do not generally take on this type or
degree of risk. Some of the new entrepreneurs may forsake more
lucrative careers and even invest their own financial resources in
order to pursue their goals, and all of them may stake their
reputations on their efforts. But there is no necessary link between
the success of these ventures and the harms or rewards that accrue
to the entrepreneur.
Many social, policy, norm, and moral
entrepreneurs will be nonprofit leaders, government officials, or
professional lobbyists; if their cause does not succeed, they will
usually still have a job—the exact same job, in fact. The notion of
return on investment likewise carries less force in these extraeconomic contexts. If the new entrepreneurs do succeed, they and
203
their backers may receive esteem benefits, a warm glow, and other
“soft” returns, but there is no mechanism to assure a personalized
benefit commensurate with the social value of the achievement.
Some formulations of social, policy, norm, and moral
entrepreneurship go further and cut out risk entirely by making
success a condition precedent. Hence, some commentators assert
that policy entrepreneurship requires “implementation” and
204
“institutionalization” of the policy at issue, and Richard Posner
suggests that we may be able to identify a moral entrepreneur as
205
such, and not as a “crank,” only after she has changed our beliefs.
These definitions seem to reject the possibility of identifying an
entrepreneur ex ante—a strange stipulation given that capitalist
entrepreneurship is most obviously identifiable at its moment of
genesis, before the venture becomes a settled concern, and only
becomes less entrepreneurial as time goes on and success breeds
bureaucratization.
Second, capitalist entrepreneurship is essentially an amoral
practice, whereas the new entrepreneurs are often driven by an
explicit moral goal. All social entrepreneurs want to make the world
a better place, some policy entrepreneurs want to enact publicinterested legislation, and many norm entrepreneurs (including all
moral entrepreneurs) want to change the boundaries of duty or
compassion. These actors profess a moral motivation and often
pitch their arguments in moral terms. Capitalist entrepreneurship
does not make similar claims for itself. If it makes the world a
better place, it is because it is in the nature of capitalist markets to

203. I take this phrase from Jim Andreoni, who coined it in explaining why
some individuals donate to charity. James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and
Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464,
464 (1990).
204. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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reward what serves human needs and wants, not because of
purposive moral struggle; it is on account of the invisible hand, not
the visible goad. Capitalist entrepreneurs, moreover, do not as a
rule make targeted interventions aimed at a specific audience. They
will sell their wares to anyone who will pay for them.
Thus, while capitalist entrepreneurs may be seen as the “real
206
heroes” of American society, spurring industry upon industry to
progress and innovation, they may also be seen as self-serving
exploiters, speculators, tricksters, and tyrants. It is true that an
increasing number of capitalist entrepreneurs now speak the
207
language of corporate social responsibility, however sincerely. But
while social, policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurs are necessarily
engaged in normative public debates about values, capitalist
entrepreneurs can, and often do, remain aloof from such concerns.
And while some of the new entrepreneurs may be compromised or
even monstrous characters—although more often they are portrayed
208
positively in the literature —they do not as a group provoke the
fundamental ambivalence that attaches to the capitalist
entrepreneur on account of her ability to destabilize settled practices
209
and distributional arrangements.
Third, and relatedly, the new entrepreneurs will in many cases
be working to reverse or ameliorate the outcomes of the free
(economic) market, whereas capitalist entrepreneurs aim to thrive
within that market and, indeed, to generate those very outcomes. I
suppose it is possible that social, policy, norm, and moral
entrepreneurship could be oriented toward promoting laissez-faire
capitalism—such has been the mission of Milton Friedman and the
210
Heritage Foundation —but in practice this has been the exception.
Instead, the new entrepreneurs tend to present themselves as
correcting for various kinds of market failures: the underprovision of
some public good, the maltreatment of some social group, the

206. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (quoting Joseph Campbell).
207. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
208. While there is a widespread tendency to valorize the new
entrepreneurs, as I noted in Part I, some authors have emphasized that these
individuals are also capable of great evil. For a particularly sharp statement of
this dualism, see Brooks, supra note 119, at 2326–27 (“Human-rights advocates
and scholars who study norms are fond of using the term ‘norm entrepreneurs’
to describe people such as Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Mother Teresa. . . . But
if Mandela is a norm entrepreneur, so is Osama bin Laden . . . .”).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 23–32 (discussing Max Weber’s and
Joseph Schumpeter’s recognition of this ambivalence).
210. For a critical appraisal of Friedman’s career as a “policy entrepreneur,”
see Paul Krugman, Who Was Milton Friedman?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 15,
2007, at 27.
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disparagement of some normative value. Capitalist entrepreneurs
are unlikely to address these market failures (if they have not done
so already) because there is no money to be made. Norms and
morals are difficult to commodify; public goods are underprovided
precisely because producers have trouble collecting from customers.
The only systematic way in which the capitalist entrepreneur
corrects for market failures is in the Kirznerian sense of exploiting
211
inefficiencies for profit, like an arbitrageur.
The new entrepreneurs may also advocate for anti-market
interventions. Through the transformation of laws or norms, they
may seek to channel and constrain the possibilities for free-market
enterprise in the hope of achieving non-economic ends. Consider, for
example, an NGO that lobbies for a ban on trade with Burma or a
feminist who argues for tighter restrictions on the production and
distribution of pornography.
Each of these actors could be
considered a social, policy, norm, and moral entrepreneur. If
successful, each would place new limits on the economic
marketplace and its business opportunities. These examples simply
make explicit what is often left implicit: that there is a basic tension,
leading sometimes to confrontation, between the work of capitalist
entrepreneurs and the work of the new entrepreneurs. This makes
it a little odd to call both groups by the same name.
Fourth, capitalist entrepreneurship has been seen since the
212
time of Jean-Baptiste Say as a positive-sum game, whereas the
new entrepreneurship will often be a zero-sum affair. Economic
theorists stress the potential for entrepreneurial innovation to
“make” new markets, satisfy a greater number of consumer desires,
213
and stimulate long-run growth—to expand the size of the pie.
Inasmuch as the market for social entrepreneurship is rational and
tends to reward those organizations that generate the greatest
social value (however measured), social entrepreneurship may share
214
some of these characteristics.
Positive externalities will be
especially likely to result when social entrepreneurs provide public
goods or help underprivileged groups gain the means to help
themselves.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41 (summarizing the views of
Kirzner and related theorists).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 11–13 (synopsizing Say’s
arguments).
213. The long-run growth claim is most associated with Joseph Schumpeter,
see supra text accompanying notes 28–32, and has by and large been borne out
by more recent econometric research. See supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
214. For a thoughtful overview of the ways in which markets “do not work as
well” for social entrepreneurs, see Dees, supra note 44, at 3.
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Policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurship, on the other hand,
often pit one set of political or normative claims against the regnant
set, with the result that one side’s gain will represent the other
side’s loss. Think of a consumer safety group advocating stricter
automobile crash-test requirements (against the desires of the
manufacturers and some future purchasers) or an evangelical
religious group advocating for a constitutional ban on same-sex
marriage (against the profound desires of many non-evangelicals).
Rarely in this world are regulatory or sociocultural changes Paretooptimal, or even close, which makes policy, norm, and moral
entrepreneurship essentially redistributive endeavors. These sorts
of tradeoffs are especially endemic in the world of policy
entrepreneurship, orbiting as it does around competing political
parties. It may be the case that some, perhaps even the majority, of
successful policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurship will move
society toward positions that are in some sense objectively
superior—although there will often be measurement and
commensurability problems here that are not present when the sole
metric of evaluation is economic efficiency—but there is nothing
intrinsic to these pursuits that can assure such an outcome. They
may be just as likely to generate rent-seeking as to generate welfare
enhancement or moral progress.
Finally, capitalist entrepreneurship is typically associated with
a single individual, the maverick founder, whereas the new forms of
entrepreneurship are more likely to involve collective efforts. Social
entrepreneurship, again, is more similar to capitalist
entrepreneurship in this respect than are the others, as an
individual can found a nonprofit organization just as easily as she
can found a for-profit organization—more easily, perhaps, owing to
the reduced capital requirements. But policy, norm, and moral
entrepreneurship are at heart acts of lobbying—of changing the
preferences or beliefs of some relevant group—and because it
requires large amounts of public argument and interpersonal
engagement, this lobbying is difficult for one person to do effectively.
I do not want to overdraw this distinction, for there are solitary
policy, norm, and moral entrepreneurs who do just fine, and there
are capitalist entrepreneurs who co-found businesses and quickly
amass a substantial team around them. At a minimum, however,
there is a difference in aesthetics. It is striking how often
nongovernmental organizations show up in the literature as
215
paradigmatic examples of norm and moral entrepreneurs.
By
215. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 134, at 154 (characterizing the Women’s
Christian Temperance Union as a moral entrepreneur); Koh, Bringing
International Law Home, supra note 110, at 647 (citing the British and Foreign
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contrast, when certain business writers began to advance the idea of
intrapreneurship (also known as corporate entrepreneurship) in the
216
1980s, it failed to catch on, I suspect, in part because the idea of
collective entrepreneurship struck many people as oxymoronic. It
violated their understanding of what it means to be a capitalist
entrepreneur.
B.

The Stakes

I have no doubt that scholars of capitalist entrepreneurship
could find additional flaws in the analogy between their subject and
the activities of the so-called social, policy, norm, and moral
entrepreneurs. But apart from semantic precision, what is at stake
in the use of the entrepreneur label? What does it matter if we call
these actors “opinion leaders,” “change agents,” “busybodies,” or
“norm entrepreneurs”?
Assuming, as I do, that linguistic
innovations cannot be justified solely in virtue of their popularity, on
what grounds might we applaud or decry the proliferating rhetoric
around entrepreneurship?
Let us dispense, first, with an evident concern that I do not
think has much force.
I described in Part I how the new
entrepreneurial terms have been invoked very loosely and defined
inconsistently. This is not a good reason to condemn them. The
same is true for traditional entrepreneurship—and is perhaps the
inevitable fate of any highly capacious concept. Users of the new
terms ought to be more explicit and rigorous about their premises.
But that is generic advice, and some have already followed it.
The deeper concern about the rise of the new entrepreneurs is
whether analogizing their work to the work of capitalist
entrepreneurs distorts or enriches the way we think about the
behaviors being described. “Rhetoric is not reality,” Margaret Jane
Radin reminded us two decades ago in a related context; “discourse
217
is not the world.”
But Professor Radin also made clear that using
market rhetoric in inappropriate spheres may lead to shoddy
reasoning, do violence to certain non-instrumental values, and
218
transform our relationship to the lived world.
I agree with Radin
that our labels matter in each of these senses. Against Radin’s
anxieties, however, I want to suggest that the use of the

Anti-Slavery Society as a historic transnational norm entrepreneur). The policy
entrepreneur literature references nongovernmental organizations much less
frequently.
216. See supra Part I.B.5.
217. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1877 (1987).
218. Id. at 1877–87.
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entrepreneur label in these contexts carries with it three
overarching implications that can breed valuable new insights and
illuminate exciting new interconnections. The neologisms discussed
in this Article are all problematic, but they are also possessed of a
rich, if often untapped, descriptive potential.
The first implication is the same one that disquieted Radin: that
more and more spheres of our collective lives can be understood in
219
market terms. As I noted above,
this way of thinking and
speaking preceded the rise of the new entrepreneurs, which helps
explain how these concepts could be adopted across the social
science disciplines so rapidly and without serious dissent. The new
entrepreneur concepts imply a specific type of market: not a
neoclassical market of perfect information, perfect competition,
220
rational decision making, and stable equilibrium, but one in which
a savvy innovator or promoter can coax and cajole her fellow
participants to a new equilibrium. The new entrepreneurs, recall,
221
are meant to be “change agents.”
There is a contingent aspect to
this vision of how social policies and norms are constructed, in that
the market does not tend toward the “natural” or “best” outcome,
but rather is subject to the vicissitudes of opportunistic behavior
and episodic change.
This implicit market metaphor carries several risks. Perhaps
the most basic risk is that writers and readers will conflate the
market for policies or norms with the market for saleable goods and
thereby overtax the metaphor—that linguistic imprecision will lead
to analytic imprecision. One form this analytic error might take is
222
the violation of Hume’s “is/ought” distinction.
It is generally
reasonable to assume that, absent illegal behavior, if capitalist
entrepreneur A brings to market a new product that puts capitalist
entrepreneur B out of business, then A’s product is superior to B’s at
219. See supra Part II.A (third-to-last paragraph).
220. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
222. I am referring here to Hume’s famous argument that a prescriptive
“ought” proposition cannot be deduced (without explanation) from a merely
descriptive “is” proposition. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469–70
(L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford 2d ed. 1978) (1739). It is
because of Hume’s is/ought distinction that it is not sufficient to say, in
evaluating the desirability of the new entrepreneur labels, that their popularity
with commentators is reason enough to preserve them. The labels may have
proven popular because they capture something new and illuminating and
worth retaining, but they may also have taken hold because of superficial
aesthetics, intellectual laziness, deference to highly regarded early users, or
sheer novelty. An affirmative argument needs to be made that these are good
(or bad) labels. Very few writers, however, have tried to provide such an
argument, and none has done so for more than one of the new terms.
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creating private economic value. Just because a particular social,
policy, norm, or moral entrepreneur carries the day, however, does
not likewise imply that her ideas are objectively superior to those of
her competitors or that she has created anything of positive social
value. The new policy entrepreneur may prevail for any number of
reasons unrelated to the public interest, including simply because
her views strike the right emotional chord—a kind of populist
appeal that most commentators would not accept as grounds for
moral or policy judgment. If the individuals being described do not
actually see themselves as entrepreneurial actors, the new labels
might also be misleading in their phenomenology. Muhammud
Yunus probably does see himself as a social entrepreneur, but would
Florence Nightingale or John Muir have accepted that
223
characterization?
Ralph Nader might see himself as a policy
entrepreneur, but does Senator Domenici (who is, after all, an
224
elected representative) see himself this way?
225
An additional concern is the potential for instrumentalism.
Calling individuals like Martin Luther King, Jr., entrepreneurs
suggests an equivalence not only in methods but also in motivations
between Dr. King and the person who starts a high-tech company in
order to strike it rich. Yet only if we define self-interest so broadly
as to be tautological are their motivations the same, and there is a
risk in calling so many non-capitalists entrepreneurs that we will
lose sight of the human capacity for other-regarding action.
Cynicism is a related hazard. If enough people follow the New York
Times in the belief that the way to “save the world” is to “treat it
226
like a business,” we may also lose sight of the reasons why the
world ought to be “saved.”
Finally, there is the risk of
commodification. Proliferating market rhetoric may undermine the
idea of public values and a public sphere, of a domain beyond the
marketplace, leading us to forget that not everything is, or should
be, up for grabs.
None of these risks need materialize, however; commentators
can check each other for analytic error and excessive
instrumentalism, cynicism, or commodification.
Counterpoised
223. I bring up Nightingale and Muir because they are two of the social
entrepreneurs identified by Ashoka as classic exemplars of the tradition. See
Ashoka: Innovators for the Public, supra note 57.
224. See KINGDON, supra note 82, at 189 (identifying Nader and Domenici as
paradigmatic policy entrepreneurs).
225. For an argument that instrumentalist thinking has had a pervasive
influence on contemporary legal thought and that this is having a corrosive
effect on the rule of law, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END:
THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2006).
226. Eakin, supra note 51, at B9 (describing social entrepreneurship).
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against these risks, there is something potentially very generative
about identifying a “market” for social policies and norms and the
role of entrepreneurs therein. As a matter of phenomenology, it is
possible that the individuals and groups that comprise the new class
of “entrepreneurs” really do see themselves as entrepreneurs. There
is a potential circularity here, in that use of the new labels may lead
these individuals to this self-conception; but the new labels may also
simply clarify what was already their instinctive orientation, even if
they had not yet articulated it as such.
More fundamentally, the new labels may offer a more accurate
and nuanced way to portray these individuals, presenting them not
simply as saints, activists, moralists, or busybodies but as players in
a kind of social game. The entrepreneur label suggests that these
individuals will share a distinct set of skills and tactics as well as
personality traits. It suggests a role not only for persuasion and
quid pro quos but also for coalition-building, marketing, tipping
points, bandwagon effects, and the like. It adds both a strategic
dimension and a social psychological dimension to the account of
policy and norm construction. This allows us to find commonalities
across different types of public figures—to see how the top-notch
lobbyist is in some sense a kindred spirit to the fire-breathing
reverend—and to find shared patterns in the evolution of policies
and norms. It allows us to model these activities and make
falsifiable predictions. In these ways, calling all of these actors
“entrepreneurs” can demystify their work.
While it may run the risk of reductionism, the market metaphor
thus holds out the promise of consilience, of “bring[ing] a diversity of
227
phenomena under a single explanatory scheme.”
The
entrepreneur label, moreover, warns against complacency and
idolatry by reminding us to think critically about those who would
speak for the public, for they too are just another breed of
salesperson. The label can inject a healthy dose of skepticism about
status-based authority that need not be cynical but simply realistic.
Beyond the market metaphor, a second underlying implication
of the new entrepreneurs is a certain vision of how social change is
achieved. To simplify dramatically, classic theories of social change
tend to emphasize, on the one hand, the power of exceptional,
visionary individuals and new ideas to move the masses or, on the
other hand, the role of material, demographic, and social-structural

227. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 41 (2001). Professor Coleman explores
the value of consilience for explanatory theory and the attendant threat of
reductionism in id. at 41–53.
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forces to compel adaptive change. The new entrepreneurs split the
difference. The entrepreneurial paradigm recognizes a role for
charisma and innovation, but a role that is disciplined by the
structure of the marketplace—by what competitors are offering,
what customers are demanding, what the government is taxing or
subsidizing. Thus, while the new entrepreneurs must be compelling
and creative to persuade relevant groups to adopt their policies or
their norms, they must also be strategic in their approach. Policy
entrepreneurs, for instance, must wait for a policy window to
emerge if they want to maximize their chances of finding a receptive
audience. They must have the endogenous capacity to be able to
exploit a window, but the window itself is an exogenous
phenomenon.
This moves us beyond a Great Man theory of history—beyond
the view that there is something “superhuman” involved in social
229
and political change —to explain the rational character of
successful advocacy and to democratize the account of who can
230
participate effectively.
It allows us to see that the pursuit of
certain forms of social and political change can be a career, just as
starting and running a business can be a career. At the same time,
the entrepreneurial conceit can move us beyond a structural theory
of change to explain the idiosyncratic, personality-driven features of
social movements and social reforms. It recognizes that while all
actors must work within the existing market paradigm, the rare
exceptional innovator can change the paradigm. Harold Koh was
able to convince so many readers that transnational norm
entrepreneurs play a central role in the construction of international
legal norms because he populated his account with individuals—
William Wilberforce, Aung San Suu Kyi, Eleanor Roosevelt—whose
influence seems to transcend any materialist or social-structural
231
explanation.
The new entrepreneurs invite the view, in John
Kingdon’s words, that it is “a false dichotomy to some extent
between structure and personality when looking at how change
232
happens.”
228. David Bornstein limns this divide in BORNSTEIN, supra note 59, at 90–
91.
229. KINGDON, supra note 82, at 183.
230. This is the inspirational promise behind Ashoka’s slogan, “everyone
a changemaker.”
See Bill Drayton, Ashoka: Innovators for the Public,
Knowing
History,
Serving
It:
Ashoka’s
Theory
of
Change,
http://www.ashoka.org/node/986 (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (“Ashoka’s job is to
make Everyone a Changemaker. To help create a world where everyone has
the freedom, confidence, and skills to turn challenges into solutions.”).
231. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 110, at 647–48.
232. KINGDON, supra note 82, at 182; see also BORNSTEIN, supra note 59, at
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It might be objected that the new labels will only muddy the
analysis because entrepreneurship, as a conceptual hybrid of the
personal and the structural, introduces an element that can never
be formally modeled to satisfaction or even rigorously specified. The
best rebuttal to this charge is that the perfect should not be the
enemy of the good. The same concern holds true for analysis of the
capitalist process, which is why neoclassical economics for so long
ignored the entrepreneur and depicted firms and households as
optimizing automata. That has come to appear as an impoverished
233
approach. Just because entrepreneurship cannot be reduced to an
algorithm does not mean that it does not exist or that it cannot
provide a clarifying construct.
The third and final implication I want to highlight is that the
use of the entrepreneur label invites a blurring of the traditional
categories of public, private, for-profit, and nonprofit. This is related
to the first two implications, which recognized the spread of markets
across novel domains and the interactions between private initiative
and the regulatory environment. As several commentators have
noted, this blurring is especially acute in the area of social
234
entrepreneurship.
Proponents of social entrepreneurship often
encourage nonprofit organizations to earn income, to take a
leadership role in providing public goods, and to collaborate with forprofit and governmental entities in new ways. Some believe that
235
for-profit companies can themselves be social entrepreneurs.
Yet
the other new entrepreneurs also destabilize the traditional
categories. Policy entrepreneurship conceptualizes policymaking
not just as the province of government officials but also of all the
groups that try to influence them.
Norm and moral
entrepreneurship open the door to a theoretically infinite range of
actors, savory and not, to determine questions of value.
There are pitfalls to this blurring. Roles may be confused.
Elected officials may see themselves not as representatives of a
constituency but as competitors in a game of policy innovation.

90–92 (making a similar point in the context of social entrepreneurship).
233. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
234. For an important discussion of this form of “blurring” in contemporary
U.S. civic life, see MINOW, supra note 47, at ch. 2 (documenting and diagnosing
pervasive “border crossing” between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors,
nonprofits and government, for-profits and government, and religious and
secular institutions). For a discussion of social entrepreneurship’s blurring
function in particular, see Dees, supra note 44, at 1. See also supra note 100
(discussing the concern that social entrepreneurship may undermine values
such as care and compassion and displace valuable forms of “old-style” charity
and social service provision).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
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Charities may lose sight of their mission in pursuit of efficiency or
236
profit. Legal distinctions may be confounded. Deeply unattractive
line-crossing may occur. Politicians may pander to bigoted voters by
developing policies that promote those voters’ moral views.
Lobbyists may craft noxious legislation to reward their clients.
Nonprofit organizations may compromise their mission by engaging
inappropriate strategic partners. There is a kind of postmodern
sensibility to the idea of “entrepreneurs” acting across so many
domains, in its suggestion that everything is the product of social
struggle; that no one set of policies or norms can be identified as
objectively best; that ideas do not win out in virtue of their abstract
merit; that capitalists can be do-gooders and moralists can be
capitalists. This raises the specter of trivializing meaningful
distinctions and licensing value relativism.
Yet this blurring is already happening in real life, and we need
a language that reflects that: the issue here is not whether the
border-crossing activities described by social, policy, norm, and
moral entrepreneurship should be occurring, but whether they are
occurring (or may be expected to occur) in the ways suggested by the
labels. While it is true that rhetoric can shape reality and that
identifying new forms of “entrepreneurship” runs the risk of
legitimizing, even valorizing, some activity that may be undesirable,
these are grounds for careful evaluation and use of the terms, not for
their dismissal. Some forms of sectoral blurring, moreover, are
desirable—here again, social entrepreneurship is the leading
example—and the entrepreneur label can capture this too. The
237
entrepreneur, recall, can be seen as a kind of bricoleur, assembling
existing materials in unforeseen ways so as to create something new
and useful. She creates value in the act of border crossing.
I think it is especially helpful that “social entrepreneurship”—
by far the most popular of the new buzzwords—invites us to
consider itself in relation to capitalist entrepreneurship.
As
238
discussed above, although social entrepreneurs aim to adopt a
business mindset, they often work to oppose market outcomes and in
this sense operate at tension with capitalist (antisocial?)
236. Thomas Kelley makes this point with respect to the definition of
“charity” in U.S. exempt organizations law. See Kelley, supra note 48, at 2472
(“In recent times, as the trends toward social entrepreneurship and venture
philanthropy have accelerated, and as the bounds between for-profit and
nonprofit enterprises have blurred, our vague, ill-discussed, ill-defined legal
definition of charity has been too amorphous to lend structure to the difficult
task of sorting out what is and is not charitable in the eyes of the law.” (citation
omitted)).
237. See supra text accompanying note 5.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 212–14.
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entrepreneurs. Yet while calling them both “entrepreneurs” might
seem to overlook this tension, it captures well the dialectical
relationship between these two groups. The key point is that social
entrepreneurs aim to rectify the market’s social harms by working
within the existing capitalist structure. They aim to preserve and
(by their lights) to improve the market system, and indeed to
emulate some of its best features, rather than to undermine it. The
basic narrative of social entrepreneurship, in which a group of
public-minded entrepreneurs intervenes to save capitalism from its
own worst tendencies, is thus an inversion of Marx’s narrative of
239
entrepreneurship precipitating capitalism’s demise.
Social
entrepreneurs are reformers, not revolutionaries. Their work is
meant to legitimate and improve upon the work of their capitalist
counterparts. Calling them anything other than entrepreneurs
would make this obscure.
CONCLUSION
This Article proceeded from an observation that the
entrepreneur label is now being applied in a variety of novel
contexts—an observation that, to my surprise, no previous
commentator seems to have made—and from a conviction that
something can be gained from evaluating these developments side
by side. Part I documented the proliferation of “entrepreneurs”
across academia, yielding a historical puzzle: these new terms
emerged more or less contemporaneously, and yet without any
reference to each other. Part II offered some tentative explanations.
Part III offered both a critique and a qualified defense of this
rhetorical move. Although the market metaphor is in some ways
misleading outside of the capitalist context, I argued, in other
respects it can be clarifying. It allows us to see the strategic
character, the distinctive vision of social change, and the blurring of
sectoral categories embedded in the concepts of social, policy, norm,
and moral entrepreneurship. Whatever readers think of these
arguments, I hope I have convinced them that this is a puzzle worth
pondering—that the appearance of “entrepreneurs” in so many
distinct conversations says something meaningful about our society
and the intellectuals who aspire to explain it.
It would be futile as well as pedantic to call for fundamental
reforms to entrepreneurship’s linguistic migration, and I have no
desire to do so. With this analysis I wish only to give future

239. See supra text accompanying notes 19–22.
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exporters of the term a sense of the tradition within which they are
operating, a framework to understand the implicit associations they
are conjuring, and some reasons for caution.

